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ABSTRACT 
In 2012, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights handed 
down Sarayaku v. Ecuador, a crucial decision on indigenous rights.  
This Article considers how the Sarayaku judgment impacts the 
Court’s case law on indigenous lands and resources, and evaluates 
that jurisprudence as a whole.  Examining the cases, it becomes 
evident that the Tribunal now connects a number of key 
indigenous rights to the right to property, Article 21 of the 
American Convention on Human Rights.  When traditional lands 
are involved, the right to property has become the Court’s 
structural basis for indigenous rights. 
For significant reasons, however, the right to property cannot 
serve as the conceptual stronghold for indigenous peoples’ 
survival and development.  First, the Court’s approach limits the 
autonomy of indigenous peoples and their capacity for change.  
Second, the right to property inherently has difficulty providing 
even basic protection for ancestral lands because domestic and 
international law grants states wide latitude to interfere with 
property.  Though the Court has attempted to create special 
‘safeguards’ for indigenous lands and resources, they have proven 
inadequate. 
In response, I urge a distinct way for the Court to conceptualize 
indigenous rights.  The right to property must be subsumed by, 
and anchored to, a stronger configurative principle to defend 
indigenous peoples’ livelihood.  Other human rights regimes offer 
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the right to self-determination or specific minority protections that 
can safeguard indigenous rights.  The relevant Inter-American 
legal instruments fail to establish such principles.  As a result, I 
propose that a broad right-to-life concept, known as vida digna in 
the Court’s case law, serve as the new structural basis for an array 
of essential indigenous norms—including cultural integrity, 
nondiscrimination, lands and resources, social development, and 
self-government.   
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[T]he destruction of the jungle erases the soul. 
— Sabino Gualinga, a leader of the Sarayaku indigenous 
community of Ecuador.1 
 
[T]here may be nice rhetoric . . . that indigenous leaders repeat.  We 
cannot hold [those] extremist positions . . . . We cannot be beggars sitting 
on a bag of gold. Those fundamentalisms, those dogmatisms just 
immobilize us. 
— Rafael Correa, President of Ecuador2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Latin American countries are in the midst of an unprecedented 
search for natural resources.3  This frenetic hunt has led directly to 
indigenous lands, which in many cases enjoy an abundance of oil, 
gas, and minerals, as well as pristine forest and waterways.  In the 
region, even when indigenous communities possess title to their 
territories, the law often establishes state ownership over water 
and subsurface resources.4  Governments, in turn, grant 
concessions to companies for exploration and extraction.  Across 
the Americas, extractive industries and hydroelectric projects 
                                                     
1 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 151 (June 27, 2012).  
2 President Rafael Correa Delgado, President of Ecuador, Discurso en la 
Cumbre Presidencial y de Autoridades Indígenas y Afrodescendientes de la 
ALBA at 13, 16 (June 25, 2010) available at http://www.presidencia.gob.ec/wp-
content/uploads/downloads/2012/10/2010-06-25_alba.pdf. 
3 Frank Bajak, Indian Political Awakening Stirs Latin America, NEWSDAY (Nov. 2, 
2009, 12:03 AM), http://www.newsday.com/business/indian-political-
awakening-stirs-latin-america-1.1561067. 
4 See, e.g., INTER-AM. COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., INDIGENOUS AND TRIBAL PEOPLES’ 
RIGHTS OVER THEIR ANCESTRAL LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES: NORMS AND 
JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 74 (2009), 
[hereinafter Inter-American Commission Thematic Report], available at 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/docs/pdf/AncestralLands.pdf; 
Dinah Shelton, Self-Determination in Regional Human Rights Law: From Kosovo to 
Cameroon, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 60, 81 (2011) (“Subsurface mineral and water rights 
belong to the state in many countries, and even conveying title to indigenous 
peoples will not be sufficient to ensure that they are properly consulted and able 
to determine the nature and scope of projects affecting their lands.”) [hereinafter 
Shelton, Self-Determination]. 
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account for billions of dollars in revenue and, in a number of 
countries, significant proportions of GNP.5 
Predictably, these epic financial interests and surging projects 
have left devastation in their wake.  Indigenous peoples in the 
hemisphere face one of their worst crises since the arrival of 
European colonizers.  To illustrate, in the Loreto region of the 
Peruvian Amazon, there were over one hundred oil spills between 
2007 and 2011.6  Rivers have been contaminated and food sources 
poisoned.7  Twenty-five indigenous ethnic groups inhabit the 
Chaco, the second-largest forest in South America after the 
Amazon.8  Yet logging currently eradicates 1,000 hectares—
equivalent to 1,000 soccer fields—of forest per day.9 
In Colombia, construction of the El Cercado dam forcibly 
displaced numerous members of the Wiwa indigenous peoples.10  
During the years preceding the dam’s completion, Wiwa 
communities endured the destruction of their homes and sacred 
sites, as well as the assassination of several spiritual and 
community leaders.11  In Ecuador, an Argentine oil company 
destroyed forests and blocked essential waterways while 
conducting exploration activities.12  After going bankrupt, the 
                                                     
5 Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 60 (finding that, in 2005, sales of crude oil 
generated approximately one-quarter of Ecuador’s GDP); Special Rapporteur on 
Indigenous Peoples, Extractive Industries Operating within or near Indigenous 
Territories, Human Rights Council, ¶ 53, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/18/35 (July 11, 2011) 
(by James Anaya) (“Several Governments highlighted the key importance of 
natural resource extraction projects for their domestic economies that, in a number 
of countries, reportedly account for up to 60 to 70 per cent of GNP.”). 
6 Milagros Salazar, Indigenous Consultations in Peru to Debut in Amazon Oil 
Region, INTER PRESS SERV. NEWS AGENCY (Sept. 5 2012), http://www.ipsnews.net/ 
2012/09/indigenous-consultations-in-peru-to-debut-in-amazon-oil-region. 
7 The degree of toxicity is so high in some areas that bioremediation is 
impossible.  Id. 
8 Fionuala Cregan & Paul Kelly, Indigenous Rights Placed above Private Interests 
at Long Last, THE IRISH TIMES (June 7, 2012, 9:36 PM), http://www.irishtimes.com/ 
newspaper/world/2012/0607/1224317439421.html.  The Chaco covers swaths of 
Argentina, Paraguay, and Bolivia. 
9 Id. 
10 Amnesty Int’l, Americas: Time and Again, Indigenous Rights Trampled for 
Development, AI INDEX, AMR 01/005/2012, Aug. 8, 2012, http://www.amnesty. 
org/en/news/americas-time-and-again-indigenous-rights-trampled-
development-2012-08-08. 
11 Id. 
12 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and 
Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 105 (June 27, 2012). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss1/3
ANTKOWIAK_1.13 (2) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2014  2:49 PM 
2013] RIGHTS, RESOURCES, AND RHETORIC 117 
company left behind powerful explosives in Sarayaku territory, as 
well as social turmoil among neighboring tribes.13 
These disturbing cases are found throughout the hemisphere, 
from Chile to Canada, and around the globe.14  They cast a dark 
shadow over the spectrum of indigenous rights—menacing their 
                                                     
13 See id. ¶¶ 291–92. 
14 See, e.g., U.N. Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, International Expert 
Group Meeting on Extractive Industries, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and 
Corporate Social Responsibility, Manila, Phil., Mar. 27-29, 2009, Report of the 
International Expert Group Meeting on Extractive Industries, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights 
and Corporate Social Responsibility, ¶ 14, U.N. Doc. E/C.19/2009/CRP. 8 (May 4, 
2009) (highlighting problems around the world); AMNESTY INT’L, SACRIFICING 
RIGHTS IN THE NAME OF DEVELOPMENT: INDIGENOUS PEOPLES UNDER THREAT IN THE 
AMERICAS 3 (2011) (noting that, around the globe, states frequently pass laws and 
undertake development projects without regard for the affected indigenous 
peoples); Bolivia Mine in Crisis after Protest Death, UPI.COM, (July 10, 2012),  
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2012/07/10/Bolivia-
mine-in-crisis-after-protest-death/UPI-33651341927642 (describing the hostilities 
between the Quechua Indians, a Canadian mining company, and the Bolivian 
government); Suzanne Goldenberg, Canadian Tar Sands Project Carries Huge Risks, 
Warn Environmental Activists, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 29, 2011, 5:56 PM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/29/tar-sands-canada-
environmental-warning (reporting that a Canadian tar sand project could 
devastate traditional indigenous lands); Sara Miller Llana & Sara Shahriari, 
Bolivian Indigenous Struggle to be Heard—by Indigenous President Morales, THE 
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Oct. 5, 2011, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/ 
Americas/2011/1005/Bolivian-indigenous-struggle-to-be-heard-by-indigenous-
President-Morales (stating that there is increasing turmoil across Latin America as 
indigenous peoples demand greater participation in decisions that affect their 
territories); Nikolaj Nielsen, MEPs Back YPF-Repsol, Despite Company Violations in 
Argentina, EUOBSERVER.COM (Apr. 20, 2012, 8:03 PM), http://EUobserver.com/ 
foreign/115972 (describing the damages an energy firm caused to indigenous 
lands in Argentina); OAS Human Rights Commission Grants Hearing on 
Hul’qumi’num Land Claim, CAN. NEWSWIRE (Oct. 5, 2011, 12:36 PM), 
http://www.newswire.ca/en/story/853935/oas-human-rights-commission-
grants-hearing-on-hul-qumi-num-land-claim (summarizing a petition before the 
Inter-American Commission against Canada for the destruction of ancestral 
lands); John Collins Rudolf, Isolated Amazon Tribes Threatened by Logging, Groups 
Say, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 3, 2011, 8:21 AM), http://green.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/ 
02/03/isolated-amazon-tribes-threatened-by-logging-groups-say (reporting on 
the potential extinction of an isolated tribe living in the Amazon rainforest due to 
illegal logging);  Fawzia Sheikh, Indigenous Peruvian Community Locked in Dispute 
with Oil Company, INTER PRESS SERV. NEWS AGENCY (Oct. 22, 2012, 8:58 PM), 
http://www.ipsnews.net/2012/05/indigenous-peruvian-community-locked-in-
dispute-with-oil-company (recounting that a Canadian oil company has caused 
damage to indigenous lands and internal strife among Amazonian tribes); Danilo 
Valladares, Guatemalan Communities Have No Say in Exploitation of Resources, INTER 
PRESS SERV. NEWS AGENCY (May 21, 2012, 9:53 PM), http://www.ipsnews.net/ 
2012/05/guatemalan-communities-have-no-say-in-exploitation-of-resources 
(depicting a crackdown on the protests of indigenous peoples resisting the 
construction of a hydroelectric dam). 
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lives, lands, and everything in between.  When communities 
protest, government and private security forces have responded 
with brutal force.15  Moreover, human rights organizations have 
decried selective prosecutions of indigenous leaders who organize 
resistance movements.16 
Yet many indigenous peoples are undeterred.  They have 
resolutely challenged intrusions upon their lands and ways of life.  
Pan-indigenous conferences and the Internet, linking groups across 
national boundaries, have facilitated resistance.17  Sharing 
strategies, they have won significant cases and driven legal reform 
efforts.18  Nevertheless, there are all too many instances where 
indigenous rights are left “entirely unprotected.”19  As the UN 
Special Rapporteur on the rights of indigenous peoples has 
recently observed:  “Major legislative and administrative reforms 
are needed in virtually all countries in which indigenous peoples 
                                                     
15 See AMNESTY INT’L, SACRIFICING RIGHTS IN THE NAME OF DEVELOPMENT, supra 
note 14, at 8. 
16 Id. at 8–9. 
17 See, e.g., KAREN ENGLE, THE ELUSIVE PROMISE OF INDIGENOUS DEVELOPMENT: 
RIGHTS, CULTURE, STRATEGY 2–3 (2010) (“[T]hese networks [of indigenous social 
movements] and the exchange of ideas and strategies are greatly facilitated by the 
Internet and other forms of modern communication . . . .”); Siegfried Wiessner, 
Indigenous Sovereignty: A Reassessment in Light of the UN Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, 41 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 1144 (2008) (recognizing that 
modern communication technologies have helped unite indigenous 
communities); Bajak, supra note 3 (“[T]he Internet allows native leaders in far-
flung villages to share ideas and strategies across international boundaries.”). 
18 To cite only two examples, “[i]n August 2011, Peru approved a law on 
[i]ndigenous [p]eoples’ right to consultation when they are likely to be affected by 
development projects.”  Amnesty Int’l, Americas: Time and Again, Indigenous Rights 
Trampled for Development, supra note 10.  It is the first of its kind in the Americas; 
however, there has been controversy over implementation and other aspects.  Id. 
at 8.  On June 28, 2010, the Supreme Court of Belize issued a judgment affirming 
the traditional land rights of the Maya communities of southern Belize.  Maya 
Leaders Alliance v. Att’y Gen. of Belize, No. 366 (Belize 2010) (unreported), 
available at 
http://www.law.arizona.edu/depts/iplp/international/maya_belize/document
s/Claim%20366%20of%202008.pdf.  The decision follows the Supreme Court’s 
landmark ruling of 2007 in favor of the two Maya communities of Santa Cruz and 
Conejo.  Aurelio Cal ex rel. Maya Vill. of Santa Cruz v. Att’y Gen. of Belize, No. 
171 (Belize 2007), available at http://www.law.arizona.edu/depts/iplp/ 
international/maya_belize/documents/ClaimsNos171and172of2007.pdf.  For 
more information, see generally, Maya Communities of Southern Belize, UNIV. OF 
ARIZ. INDIGENOUS PEOPLES LAW & POLICY PROGRAM,  http://www.law.arizona. 
edu/depts/iplp/international/mayaBelize.cfm (last visited Oct. 7, 2013). 
19 Special Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, ¶ 58, Human 
Rights Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/47 (July 6, 2012) (by James Anaya).  
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live to adequately define and protect their rights over lands and 
resources and other rights that may be affected by extractive 
industries.”20  Without such drastic changes, governments and 
corporations will continue to pursue lucrative projects without 
regard for indigenous communities. 
To overcome domestic obstacles, indigenous peoples have 
taken their complaints to international bodies.  United Nations 
mechanisms have issued numerous communications in their favor.  
Within the Organization of American States (OAS), the Inter-
American Commission and Court of Human Rights have 
increasingly heard the petitions of indigenous peoples.  In 2010, the 
Inter-American Commission called on Guatemala to suspend 
operations at the Marlin gold mine after allegations made by 
communities that the mining had begun without their consent, 
seriously harming their lives, health, and property.21 
In 2011, the Commission requested that Brazil halt construction 
on the Belo Monte hydroelectric power plant, a large initiative that 
endangered indigenous communities of the Xingu River Basin in 
Pará, Brazil.22  In response, the State “withdrew [its] ambassador 
from the OAS and stopped paying dues to the organisation.”23  
These and other Commission decisions have led to stinging 
criticism from a block of Latin American states, which has called 
for a sharp reduction in its powers.24  Both the Marlin gold mine 
and the Belo Monte dam have continued operations. 
                                                     
20 Id. 
21 AMNESTY INT’L, SACRIFICING RIGHTS IN THE NAME OF DEVELOPMENT, supra 
note 14, at 10 (“In June 2011, the State declared that it would not comply with the 
Inter-American Commission’s order to suspend mining activities, and the mine 
continues to operate.”). 
22 Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Precautionary Measures: Indigenous Communities of 
the Xingu River Basin, Pará, Brazil, PM 382/10 (Apr. 1, 2011), available at 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/protection/precautionary.asp. 
23 Chipping at the Foundations: The Regional Justice System Comes under Attack 
from the Countries whose Citizens Need it Most, THE ECONOMIST, June 9, 2012, 
http://www.economist.com/node/21556599/print. 
24 This opposition owes to several issues, not only to decisions regarding 
indigenous peoples.  See id. (noting that freedom of the press is a major point of 
contention).  The block of states—among them Venezuela, Ecuador, Cuba, 
Nicaragua, and Bolivia—is known as La Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de 
Nuestra América or ALBA.  Id.  In September of 2012, “Venezuela presented to the 
Secretary General of the Organization of American States a notice of denunciation 
of the American Convention on Human Rights.” Press Release, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n on Human Rights, IACHR Regrets Decision of Venezuela to Denounce 
the American Convention on Human Rights (Sept. 12, 2012), available at 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2012/117.asp. 
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The Inter-American Court, for its part, is the world’s only 
human rights body to have issued legally-binding judgments on 
resource extraction in indigenous territories.  In contrast, the Inter-
American Commission and UN mechanisms are only capable of 
producing recommendations.  The Court stands as a key guardian 
for indigenous rights in the hemisphere, especially with the 
Commission’s mandate under fire.  The Court’s judgments are also 
noteworthy for their detailed nature, setting out elaborate 
safeguards and remedies for indigenous and tribal populations.  
Although it primarily interprets the American Convention on 
Human Rights, the Tribunal’s influence has extended around the 
globe. 
In fact, the UN Special Rapporteur on indigenous rights cites 
the Inter-American Court as a primary legal authority in defense of 
all indigenous communities threatened by commercial projects.  
The Court’s landmark case on this topic, the 2007 judgment 
Saramaka v. Suriname, condemned logging and mining initiatives 
on traditional lands.  The African Commission on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, among other bodies, has also been deeply 
influenced by Saramaka and other Court precedents.25 
In June of 2012, the Court handed down Sarayaku v. Ecuador, its 
most important decision on extractive industries and indigenous 
peoples since Saramaka.  This article considers how the Sarayaku 
judgment impacts the Court’s case law on indigenous lands and 
resources, and evaluates that jurisprudence as a whole.  Examining 
the influential line of cases, it becomes evident that the Tribunal 
now closely binds a number of key indigenous rights—such as 
cultural identity, political participation, and juridical personality—
to Article 21, the American Convention’s right to property.  When 
traditional lands are involved, the right to property has become the 
Court’s structural basis for indigenous rights. 
For significant reasons, however, the right to property cannot 
serve as the conceptual stronghold for indigenous peoples’ 
survival and development.  First, the Court’s approach limits the 
autonomy of indigenous peoples and their capacity for change.  
Basing varied and essential rights on land as the Tribunal does 
                                                     
25 See, e.g., Centre for Minority Rights Development (Kenya) and Minority 
Rights Group International (on behalf of Endorois Welfare Council) v. Kenya, 
Comm. No. 276/2003, Afr. Comm’n on Human & Peoples’ Rights (Feb. 4, 2010) 
(citing Saramaka for various propositions). 
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requires that indigenous peoples have a very specific, and often 
unrealistic, relationship to their territories. 
Second, the right to property inherently has difficulty 
providing even basic protection for ancestral lands, because 
domestic and international law grants states wide latitude to 
interfere with property.  In recent judgments, in fact, the Inter-
American Court has debilitated the right even further, rendering 
Article 21 one of the most compromised provisions of the 
American Convention.  While in Saramaka the Tribunal attempted 
to fashion special ‘safeguards’ for indigenous lands and resources 
under Article 21—such as requiring consultation with 
communities—these protections are too easily evaded by states.  
Moreover, after Sarayaku, the safeguards are in decline. 
In response, I urge a distinct way for the Court to conceptualize 
indigenous rights.  The right to property must be subsumed by, 
and anchored to, a stronger configurative principle to defend 
indigenous peoples’ livelihood.  Other human rights regimes offer 
the right to self-determination or specific minority protections that 
can safeguard indigenous rights.  The American Convention and 
other Inter-American legal instruments fail to establish such 
principles.  As a result, I propose that a broad right-to-life concept, 
known as vida digna in the Court’s case law, serve as the 
framework for an array of essential indigenous norms—including 
cultural integrity, nondiscrimination, lands and resources, social 
development, and self-government. 
The right to vida digna, often translated as ‘the right to a 
dignified life,’ offers a promising new structural basis for 
indigenous rights.  It is a versatile, multidimensional right that has 
ascended in the Court’s jurisprudence.  The Tribunal has already 
used vida digna as a means to protect various human rights that it 
associates with a ‘dignified life.’  Of course, a right-to-life 
framework also reinforces that the communities’ lives and 
livelihood are truly in jeopardy, and thus raises the standards for 
indigenous rights and remedies in the Inter-American system. 
The Article follows this order:  in Part 2, indigenous rights in 
international law are generally considered.  Part 2 also introduces 
James Anaya’s theory on self-determination as a central frame of 
reference for this work.  Part 3 assesses key indigenous rights 
judgments of the Inter-American Court, underscoring the 
Tribunal’s unique—and ultimately flawed—development of the 
right to property.  Finally, in Part 4, I propose the shift to a right-to-
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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life approach and examine the implications of this 
reconceptualization. 
2. INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The following Section introduces certain international legal 
developments of crucial relevance to indigenous peoples.  Such 
aspects include the ascent of the human rights paradigm in 
indigenous advocacy, as well as the central—and controversial—
notion of self-determination.  To frame and focus this discussion, I 
highlight the work of James Anaya, a leading scholar on 
indigenous rights and the current UN Special Rapporteur on the 
subject.  In particular, I emphasize his self-determination theory, 
which offers a cogent interpretation of indigenous priorities and 
achievements. 
2.1. Background 
Indigenous rights in international law have risen to 
prominence in the last three decades.26  Paternalistic and 
assimilationist norms are increasingly discarded in favor of a 
framework that grants greater control to indigenous peoples over 
their cultures, lands, and modes of governance.27  In 1989, the 
                                                     
26 See, e.g., S. JAMES ANAYA, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 7 (2d 
ed. 2004) (affirming “results within the [legal] international system for indigenous 
peoples”); INT’L LAW ASSOC’N, THE HAGUE CONFERENCE ON THE RIGHTS OF 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 1–6 (2010), available at http://www.ila-
hq.org/en/committees/index.cfm/cid/1024 [hereinafter ILA Report] (stating 
that, over the last decades, the “shift away from positivist, state-dominated 
dialogue toward a more inclusive framework” has been more responsive to 
indigenous peoples’ concerns); WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL ODYSSEYS: 
NAVIGATING THE NEW INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF DIVERSITY 3 (2007) (arguing that 
intergovernmental organizations are recently “encouraging, and sometimes 
pressuring, states to adopt a more multicultural approach” in law and other 
areas); PATRICK THORNBERRY, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 20–32 (2002) 
(describing the growth of indigenous rights in international human rights law); 
Karen Engle, On Fragile Architecture: The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples in the Context of Human Rights, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 141, 142 (2011) (“[I]n the 
1980s and 1990s, [indigenous rights advocates] began to articulate their claims in 
human rights terms, particularly the human right to culture.”) [hereinafter Engle, 
On Fragile Architecture]; Siegfried Wiessner, Rights and Status of Indigenous Peoples: 
A Global Comparative and International Legal Analysis, 12 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 100–
110 (1999) (summarizing the varied roles of the International Labor Organization, 
the United Nations, the Organization of American States, and the World Bank 
with respect to indigenous rights over the last three decades). 
27 Cf. International Labour Organisation, Indigenous and Tribal Populations 
Convention, June 26, 1957, No. 107, 328 U.N.T.S. 247 (“[T]he adoption of general 
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International Labour Organisation took a major step by adopting 
the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention.28  In 2007, after 
years of negotiation, the United Nations introduced its Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (“UNDRIP”).29 
James Anaya provides a compelling account of the foundations 
for indigenous empowerment in international law.30  He begins by 
disapproving of the oft-cited sovereignty justification for ‘first 
nations.’31  That approach generally holds that indigenous peoples, 
as a legal matter, should be conceived as autonomous states whose 
original sovereignty over their territories and resources has been 
usurped by colonizing forces.32  To be sure, Anaya underscores—
and discusses at length—the centuries of abuse and displacement 
inflicted by European settlers.33  But he believes that a classic 
sovereignty argument suffers fatal limitations.34  It must yield to 
                                                     
international standards on the subject will facilitate action to assure the protection 
of the populations concerned, their progressive integration into their respective 
national communities . . . .”).  The International Labour Organisation’s more 
recent Convention rejects this “assimilationist orientation” in its Preamble:   
the developments which have taken place in international law since 1957, 
as well as developments in the situation of indigenous and tribal peoples 
in all regions of the world, have made it appropriate to adopt new 
international standards on the subject with a view to removing the 
assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards . . . . 
International Labour Organisation, Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 
June 27, 1989, No. 169, 1650 U.N.T.S. 383, 384  [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 
169].  But see Sharon Venne, The New Language of Assimilation: A Brief Analysis of 
ILO Convention 169, 2 WITHOUT PREJUDICE: EAFORD INT’L REV. RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION 53, 53 (1989) (arguing that the ILO Convention No. 169 is still 
assimilationist and “far more destructive than its predecessor,” Convention No. 
107). 
28 ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 27. 
29 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 
61/295, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 12, 2007). 
30 See ANAYA, supra note 26, at 3–96. 
31 See ANAYA, supra note 26, at 21. This is not to say that Anaya disapproves 
of the actual phrase “first nations.”  
32 See ANAYA, supra note 26 at 6-7; Karen Engle, Indigenous Rights Claims in 
International Law: Self-Determination, Culture, and Development, in ROUTLEDGE 
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 331, 333 (David Armstrong ed., 2009) 
[hereinafter Engle, Indigenous Rights Claims]; RONALD NIEZEN, THE ORIGINS OF 
INDIGENISM: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE POLITICS OF IDENTITY 29–36, 40–52 (2003); 
Wiessner, supra note 17, at 1145–49.  
33 See generally ANAYA, supra note 26. 
34 Id. at 109 (identifying the limitations to be two-fold:  (1) its tendency to 
maintain the “status quo of political ordering”; and (2) its restrictions upon 
“international competency”).   
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the longstanding international doctrine of state sovereignty, which 
excluded non-Europeans and jealously guards against political 
entities unrecognized by this archaic process.35 
Instead, Anaya focuses upon an international human rights 
discourse.  Yet transposing communal principles of indigenous 
peoples into an individualistic rights framework is not a task to be 
taken lightly.36  Few general human rights instruments champion 
collective or group rights.37  Specific protections for minorities are 
                                                     
35 See id. at 6–7 (tracking the historical tendency to favor colonization and 
classify non-European peoples as unqualified for statehood).  For examples of this 
discriminatory approach, see LASSA OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, VOL. 1: 
PEACE, § 27 (1905) (explaining that one condition for a new state to be admitted to 
the “Family of Nations” was that it, foremost, “be a civilised State which is in 
constant intercourse with members of the Family of Nations”).  Antony Anghie 
has examined and criticized how the non-European world was excluded from 
‘international society.’  Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries: Sovereignty and 
Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 4 (1999).  
Others may continue to use the term sovereignty, although with nuanced or 
reconceptualized meanings.  See, e.g., Federico Lenzerini, Sovereignty Revisited: 
International Law and Parallel Sovereignty of Indigenous Peoples, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 155, 
189 (2006) (articulating a dynamic formulation of sovereignty that applies both to 
states and sub-state entities by which groups of people can exercise  certain 
degrees of autonomy within the state); Wiessner, supra note 17, at 1170–76 (stating 
that sovereignty is synonymous with, and inseparable from, a sense of cultural 
identity). 
36 See, e.g., Engle, Indigenous Rights Claims, supra note 32, at 335 
(“’[E]levat[ing] the individual to the point that the group is forgotten’ . . . would . . 
. threaten indigenous culture.”) (alteration in original) (citation omitted); JÉRÉMIE 
GILBERT, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES’ LAND RIGHTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW: FROM 
VICTIMS TO ACTORS 115 (2006) (postulating that indigenous collective land 
ownership principles are in tension with an individualistic approach to property); 
Engle, On Fragile Architecture, supra note 26, at 151–55 (arguing that, in the cases 
cited, individual rights “trumped” collective rights).  But several maintain that 
group rights are not incompatible with the contemporary human rights paradigm.  
See, e.g., Gillian Triggs, The Rights of ‘Peoples’ and Individual Rights: Conflict or 
Harmony?, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES 141, 155-57 (James Crawford ed., 1988) 
(describing an interdependent relationship between group and individual rights); 
B. G. Ramcharan, Individual, Collective and Group Rights: History, Theory, Practice 
and Contemporary Evolution, 1 INT’L J. GROUP RTS. 27, 42 (1993) (concluding that 
collective rights are not inconsistent with individual human rights). 
37 Of course, there are exceptions, among them Common Article 1 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which establishes that “[a]ll 
peoples have the right to self-determination.”  International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, art. 1(1), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. E, 95-2 
(1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, art. 1(1), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3.  The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights recognizes “peoples” rights for the first 
time in a multilateral human rights treaty.  African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, June 27, 1981, 1520 U.N.T.S. 217 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986), 
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also lacking in the major international and regional human rights 
conventions.  The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR) stands as the main exception.  Yet initially its 
Article 27 was regarded as a mere non-interference provision, 
which only required the state’s tolerance of a minority culture.38 
Despite these limitations, indigenous advocates have achieved 
a number of victories utilizing, and then expanding, the 
international human rights paradigm.  Significant examples 
include the abovementioned ILO and UN texts, which contain 
provisions that moved beyond existing human rights norms to 
“express specific aspirations and self-understandings of 
indigenous groups.”39  Also, several regional and international 
                                                     
available at http://www.achpr.org/instruments/achpr/.  Interestingly, Article 27 
of the ICCPR takes a hybrid approach—a formulation that “hovered uneasily 
between an individual and a communal right,” according to James Crawford.  
James Crawford, The Rights of Peoples: Some Conclusions, in THE RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, 
supra note 36, at 159, 162.  In its general comment on Article 27, the Human Rights 
Committee stated that, “[a]lthough the rights protected under article 27 are 
individual rights, they depend in turn on the ability of the minority group to 
maintain its culture, language or religion.”  U.N. Human Rights Committee, Gen. 
Comment No. 23: The Rights of Minorities (Art. 27), ¶ 6.2, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.5 (Apr. 8, 1994).  
38 See Ian Brownlie, Rights of Peoples in Modern International Law, in THE 
RIGHTS OF PEOPLES, supra note 36, at 1, 3 (positing that Article 27 does not require 
state positive action); Will Kymlicka, Theorizing Indigenous Rights, 49 U. TORONTO 
L.J. 281, 284 (1999) (stating that Article 27 has been understood to “include only 
negative rights of non-interference”).  Nowak remarks that Article 27 “is the only 
provision in the Covenant with the typically negative formulation”; that is, 
individuals “shall not be denied the right.”  MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR COMMENTARY 657 (2nd rev. ed. 2005) (emphasis 
in original).  An attempt failed to change the language to “[t]he States shall 
ensure,” in order to obligate positive state measures.  Id.  In any event, Nowak 
points to reasons why even the negative formulation should result in positive 
state measures to combat discrimination.  Id. at 658. 
39 Benedict Kingsbury, Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of 
Indigenous Peoples’ Claims in International and Comparative Law, 34 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. 
& POL. 189, 238, 238 n.174 (2001) (citing, among others, provisions on self-
government and “the right to maintain and strengthen their distinctive spiritual 
and material relationships with the lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and 
other resources which they have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or 
used, and to uphold their responsibility to future generations in this regard”) 
(citing Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Draft Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples, art. 25, 44th Sess., Agenda Item 14, at 50, Annex I, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/29 (1993)).  See also Lillian Aponte Miranda, Indigenous 
Peoples as International Lawmakers, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 203, 207 (2010) 
(“[I}ndigenous peoples have played a significant role in changing the legal 
landscape of human rights . . . .”). 
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human rights bodies have generated jurisprudence to support 
indigenous rights, even when they interpret texts that fail to name 
such rights expressly.40 
Anaya assesses many of these decisions, principles, and 
discourse.  At the heart of it all, he concludes, lies the concept of 
self-determination.  Since the beginning, indigenous peoples have 
framed their demands within this precept.41  And, after strenuous 
political battles, the UNDRIP finally expressed their “right to self-
determination” by which indigenous peoples “freely determine 
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development.”42  The term is noticeably absent from the 
                                                     
40 These bodies include the Inter-American Commission and Court of 
Human Rights (see Part III, infra, for a discussion of Court decisions) and the 
African Court and Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  As for UN 
mechanisms, numerous treaty bodies have recently addressed the rights of 
indigenous peoples, including:  the Human Rights Committee, the Committee on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, the Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, the Committee against 
Torture, the Committee on Elimination of Discrimination Against Women, the 
Committee on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members 
of Their Families, and the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.  
See 5 FOREST PEOPLES PROGRAMME, INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND UNITED NATIONS 
HUMAN RIGHTS BODIES: A COMPILATION OF UN TREATY BODY JURISPRUDENCE, THE 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS COUNCIL AND ITS SPECIAL PROCEDURES, 
AND THE ADVICE OF THE EXPERT MECHANISM ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 
(Fergus MacKay ed., 2011–12), available at http://www.forestpeoples.org/sites 
/fpp/files/publication/2013/01/cos-2011-12.pdf (compiling  indigenous rights 
jurisprudence from all of these UN bodies). 
41 See, e.g., ANAYA, supra note 26, at 97 (concluding that self-determination is 
“a principle of highest order” among indigenous peoples); THORNBERRY, supra 
note 26, at 4 (explaining that indigenous advocates have characterized self-
determination as “their key to advancement”); Engle, Indigenous Rights Claims, 
supra note 32, at 333 (stating that self-determination was the prevailing discourse 
for indigenous advocates throughout the 1970s and into the late 1980s); 
Chairperson-Rapporteur of the U.N. Comm’n on Human Rights Working Group, 
Indigenous Issues: Rep. of the Working Group Established in  
Accordance with Commission on Human Rights Resolution 1995/32, Comm’n on 
Human Rights, ¶ 38, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2000/84 (Dec. 6, 1999) (by Luis-Enrique 
Chávez) (affirming overwhelming indigenous support of the right to self-
determination at the discussions around the drafting of the UN Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples); Kingsbury, supra note 39, at 216-17 (illustrating 
how indigenous representatives have pushed to include a right to self-
determination). 
42 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 
61/295, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/295, at art. 3 (Sept. 13, 2007). 
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ILO Convention, which was drafted with less indigenous 
participation.43 
Self-determination is a jarring proposition for governments of 
multicultural states.  If ethnic groups may “freely determine their 
political status,”44 a state’s territorial and political integrity could 
be jeopardized.  A leading provision establishing “the right of self-
determination” to “all peoples,” in Article 1 of the ICCPR 
(replicated in Article 1 of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights) (“Common Article 1”), was hotly 
contested during negotiations.45  Out of the debates and varied 
interpretations, Manfred Nowak concludes that the “sole 
undisputed point is that peoples living under colonial rule or 
comparable alien subjugation” are entitled to the Covenant’s 
right.46 
Thus, the classic context for Common Article 1 consisted in 
colonies asserting their independence from external oppression.  It 
did not specifically contemplate the struggles of indigenous 
communities.47  Yet self-determination does not only refer to the 
creation of new states.  Many authorities now recognize external 
and internal (or ‘strong’ and ‘weak’) forms of self-determination.48  
                                                     
43 See, e.g., ANAYA, supra note 26, at 59 (noting their “limited participation in 
the deliberations”); MAKING THE DECLARATION WORK: THE UNITED NATIONS 
DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS PEOPLES 10 (Claire Charters & Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen eds., Elaine Bolton trans., 2009) (“In a first for international law, the 
rights bearers, indigenous peoples, played a pivotal role in the negotiations on  
[the UN Declaration’s] content . . . .”); Kingsbury, supra note 39, at 238 (affirming 
limited involvement of indigenous peoples in the drafting of ILO Convention 169 
in the 1980s).  Still, as Dinah Shelton indicates, the ILO Convention advances 
several elements of internal self-determination without using the term.  Shelton, 
Self-Determination, supra note 4, at 62. 
44 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 37, at art. 
1(1); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, supra note 
37, at art. 1(1). 
45 See NOWAK, supra note 38, at 10 (“The historical background of Art. 1 in 
both Covenants is characterized by fundamental differences of opinion.”). 
46 Id. at 22 (emphasis omitted).   
47 See id. at 650; Engle, Indigenous Rights Claims, supra note 32, at 336; Richard 
Falk, The Rights of Peoples (In Particular Indigenous Peoples), in THE RIGHTS OF 
PEOPLES, supra note 36, at 26–27. 
48 See, e.g., Special Rapporteur for the Sub-Commission on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Study of the Problem of Discrimination 
Against Indigenous Populations: Final Rep. (Last Part), Comm’n on Human Rights, ¶ 
109, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.6 (May 24, 1984) (by José R. 
Martinez Cobo) (stating that indigenous peoples attain “a necessary measure of 
autonomy or self-determination” through “[t]heir own forms of organization and 
internal control . . . .”); Brownlie, supra note 38, at 4 (emphasizing that self-
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The latter does not require the fracturing of a state’s political and 
territorial unity; rather, it alludes to alternate forms of autonomy 
within a nation’s borders.  In the words of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, internal self-determination can be 
realized through “self-government, local government, federalism 
. . . or any other form of relations that accords with the wishes of 
the people.”49 
But several have noted a tipping point when external self-
determination may be justified.50  Secession and independence 
could be options in situations of severe human rights abuse, or 
when peoples are “denied the right to participate in 
government.”51  Such an interpretation possesses logical and moral 
                                                     
determination is a dynamic rather than static concept, due to the contributions of 
human rights law); Crawford, supra note 37, at 162 (describing “other political 
forms” that do not require “complete independence”); R. Higgins, Postmodern 
Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 29, 31 (Catherine Brölmann et al. eds., 1993) (discussing differences between 
external and internal self-determination); Shelton, Self-Determination, supra note 4, 
at 62-81 (describing an internal form of self-determination in which indigenous 
peoples exercise autonomy through particular institutions, ways of life, and 
economic development within the state). 
49 Katangese Peoples’ Congress v. Zaire, Afr. Comm’n on Hum. & Peoples’ 
Rts., Commc’n No. 75/92, AHRLR 72 ¶ 4 (1995), available at 
http://www.acphr.org/. 
50 See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 61 (2d ed. 2005) (“Peoples 
under colonial domination have the right to external self-determination . . . .”); 
James Crawford, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its 
Development and Future, in PEOPLES’ RIGHTS 7, 64-65 (Philip Alston ed., 2005) 
[hereinafter Crawford, Right of Self-Determination] (considering that measures by 
the central government that grossly discriminate against a people may make a 
case for external self-determination); Willem van Genugten, Protection of 
Indigenous Peoples on the African Continent: Concepts, Position Seeking, and the 
Interaction of Legal Systems, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 29, 40 (2010) (noting that external 
self-determination may be justified when the state denies a people participatory 
rights or other fundamental rights) (citing ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 
119 (2d ed. 2005)).  Note, however, that the International Court of Justice avoided 
resolving the matter of “remedial secession” and related topics in its recent 
advisory opinion on Kosovo.  Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral 
Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo, Advisory Opinion, 2010 I.C.J. 
2, ¶¶ 82-83 (July 22), available at www.icj-cij.org. 
51 See Katangese, supra note 46, ¶ 6 (“In the absence of concrete evidence of 
violations of human rights to the point that the territorial integrity of Zaire should 
be called to question and in the absence of evidence that the people of Katanga are 
denied the right to participate in government as guaranteed by article 13(1) of the 
African Charter, the Commission holds the view that Katanga is obliged to 
exercise a variant of self-determination that is compatible with the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Zaire.”).  Dinah Shelton remarks that the Commission 
“seemed to suggest . . . that as long as everyone was being treated equally 
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force; limiting the possibility of independence to overseas 
colonies—the “salt-water thesis” of Common Article 1—is 
arbitrary.52  National minorities and ethnic groups can be just as 
tyrannized as such colonies.53  In this way, some indigenous 
advocates were dismayed when Article 46(1) was added to the 
UNDRIP.54  The provision appears to forbid external self-
determination by stating: 
Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying 
for any State, people, group or person any right to engage 
in any activity or to perform any act . . . construed as 
authorizing or encouraging any action which would 
dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial 
integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent 
States.55 
Anaya, for his part, resists the internal/external dichotomy for 
self-determination.  He states that there are a number of ways 
individuals and communities associate in our era, “including but 
not exclusively those organized around the state.”56  He prefers to 
conceive of self-determination as applying “throughout the 
spectrum of multiple and overlapping spheres of human 
association.”57  His concept, then, appears very flexible with 
respect to how groups or “peoples” are defined; all such “segments 
of humanity” are entitled to self-determination.58 
According to Anaya, self-determination is “grounded in the 
idea that all are equally entitled to control their own destinies.”59  
Those who suffer violations to their self-determination are entitled 
                                                     
(poorly), no particular group had the right to escape.”  Shelton, Self-Determination, 
supra note 4, at 66 n.42.  See also, Crawford, Right of Self-Determination, supra note 
50, at 65 (“Measures grossly discriminating against the people of a territory on 
grounds of their ethnic origin or cultural distinctiveness may . . . constitut[e] the 
case for external self-determination . . . .”). 
52 KYMLICKA, supra note 26, at 209; Kymlicka, Theorizing Indigenous Rights, 
supra note 38, at 284. 
53 Kymlicka, Theorizing Indigenous Rights, supra note 38, at 285. 
54 Engle, On Fragile Architecture, supra note 26, at 146. 
55 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 
42, at art. 46(1). 
56 ANAYA, supra note 26, at 105. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 104. 
59 Id. at 98. 
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to redress.  While independence was an appropriate remedy for 
colonization, Anaya hastens to add that “the remedial regime 
developing in the context of indigenous peoples is not one that 
favors the formation of new states.”60  Still, to redress violations to 
indigenous self-determination, structural remedies must be 
designed to respond to past abuses, as well as “to protect against 
current and potential future wrongs.”61 
2.2. Anaya’s Five Core Principles 
Anaya sets out core principles that “elaborate upon the 
requirements of self-determination.”62  Self-determination is not 
merely a matter of political rights.  Rather, it is comprised of five 
dimensions:  “nondiscrimination, cultural integrity, lands and 
resources, social welfare and development, and self-
government.”63 
Anaya shows that these five principles have been emphasized 
by indigenous peoples and reinforced by international human 
rights authorities.  All of these norms find support, to greater or 
lesser extent, in the ILO Convention and the UNDRIP.  With 
respect to nondiscrimination specifically, Anaya also cites, among 
other sources, concluding observations and a general 
recommendation from the UN Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination; these documents condemn pervasive 
discrimination against indigenous peoples, which endangers “their 
culture and their historical identity.”64 
As mentioned above, the ICCPR’s Article 27 ostensibly protects 
cultural integrity in the international legal landscape.  Despite the 
provision’s modest beginnings, the UN Human Rights Committee 
(“Human Rights Committee”) has asserted that it in fact requires 
both negative and positive state obligations to protect minorities.65  
Anaya reviews cases where the Committee has applied Article 27 
                                                     
60 Id. at 104. 
61 Id. at 125.  In recognition of the very right that was violated (self-
determination), such remedial measures must be developed with the victims 
themselves.  See id. at 113.  
62 Id. at 129. 
63 Id. 
64 Rep. of the Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Annex V, ¶ 
3, at 122, U.N. Doc A/52/18; GAOR 52d Sess., Supp. No. 18 (Sept. 26, 1997). 
65 The Rights of Minorities, supra note 37, ¶¶ 6.2, 7. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss1/3
ANTKOWIAK_1.13 (2) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2014  2:49 PM 
2013] RIGHTS, RESOURCES, AND RHETORIC 131 
to safeguard the cultural integrity of indigenous communities.66  In 
addition, he refers to global instruments that seek to protect 
national minorities.67 
As for the protection of ancestral lands and resources, the Inter-
American system of human rights has taken a leading role.68  Some 
of these cases are discussed in Anaya’s work; several judgments 
are examined in detail below (see infra Part III).  Concerning his 
category of “social welfare and development,” Anaya highlights 
provisions from the UNDRIP (at that time in draft form) and the 
ILO Convention that seek to improve the life and work conditions 
of indigenous peoples.69 
Finally, “[s]elf-government is the overarching political 
dimension” of self-determination, following Anaya’s framework.70  
Self-government consists of two facets.  The first grants indigenous 
populations governmental autonomy at the community level, and 
the second ensures their effective participation within higher levels 
of state and national government.  As an essential part of self-
government, routine consultation with indigenous communities is 
increasingly demanded by human rights bodies and other 
international institutions, as Anaya shows and as is further 
considered below.71 
2.3. Anaya in Perspective 
In many instances Anaya asserts that his self-determination 
framework is already recognized in international law; his project 
                                                     
66 See ANAYA, supra note 26, at 136 (noting that group interest in cultural 
survival make take priority). 
67 See id. at 131–40 (citing texts such as the Council of Europe’s Framework 
Convention on the Rights of National Minorities). 
68 See infra Part III (providing analysis of several Inter-American Court 
judgments).  See also ENGLE, supra note 17, at 167, 180 (highlighting decisions by 
the Inter-American Court); GILBERT, supra note 36, at 114 (pointing to the Inter-
American system’s leading decisions); Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Evolution of 
International Indigenous Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 6 HUM. 
RTS. L. REV. 281, 283 (2006) (lauding the “progressive case law” of the Inter-
American Court and the Inter-American Commission on this topic). 
69 ANAYA, supra note 26, at 149–50. 
70  Id. at 150. 
71 See id. at 153–56; infra Parts III and IV (examining the Inter-American 
Court’s “right to consultation” and its pitfalls).  See also Tara Ward, The Right to 
Free, Prior, and Informed Consent: Indigenous Peoples’ Participation Rights within 
International Law, 10 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 54, 84 (2011) (providing a detailed 
study of this “developing norm”). 
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aims to furnish the underlying theory for accepted doctrine and 
practice.  Yet Will Kymlicka has objected that established 
international law fails to support some of his claims.72  Given 
Anaya’s expansive thesis on the beneficiaries of self-determination, 
for example, non-indigenous groups would also have strong 
claims to self-determination under international law.  But 
Kymlicka points out that this is not the case, alluding to legal 
instruments on “stateless nations,” such as the Council of Europe’s 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.73  
These texts have “avoided any reference to territorial autonomy or 
political self-determination.”74   
Similarly, Anaya argues that varied rights and 
“understandings” with respect to indigenous peoples have 
attained the lofty rank of customary international law.75  This 
mandatory category “results from a general and consistent practice 
of states followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”76  The 
principle of nondiscrimination has reached this level.77  However, 
at the time of his book’s publication (2004), before even the 
adoption of the UNDRIP, various precise aspects of indigenous 
rights were still developing (albeit rapidly) in the international 
sphere.78  For example, the appealing indigenous right to “social 
                                                     
72 Kymlicka, Theorizing Indigenous Rights, supra note 38, at 299. 
73 Id. at 283. 
74 Id. 
75 ANAYA, supra note 26, at 72. 
76 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
§ 102(2) (1986).  It continues: 
For a practice of states to become a rule of customary international law it 
must appear that the states follow the practice from a sense of legal 
obligation (opinio juris sive necessitatis); a practice that is generally 
followed but which states feel legally free to disregard does not 
contribute to customary law. 
Id. at cmt. c.  See also Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(b), 59 
Stat. 1055 (Apr. 18, 1946), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/ 
?p1=4&p2=2&p3=0 (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (referring to “international custom, 
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law”). 
77 See, e.g., Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, 
Advisory Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶ 101 (Sept. 17, 
2003) (“[T]he fundamental principle of equality and non-discrimination has 
entered the realm of jus cogens.”). 
78 Though Anaya acknowledges that “the specific contours of these norms 
are still evolving and remain somewhat ambiguous,” he does describe certain 
rights as forming part of customary international law.  ANAYA, supra note 26, at 72.  
It should be noted that, in 2010 (six years after Anaya’s book and three years after 
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welfare and development,” particularly at the time, represented 
more of an emerging norm than a globally-binding right.79  Thus, 
Anaya’s account may have overestimated the status of certain 
indigenous rights in international law. 
In this respect, consider also the two principal international 
texts on indigenous rights.  The ILO Convention, while a binding 
treaty, has only been ratified by twenty-two states worldwide since 
1989.80  Some indigenous groups, moreover, have expressed 
serious disappointment at the Convention’s limits.81  For its part, 
the UNDRIP, although a significant accomplishment, is technically 
an unenforceable instrument.  It only emerged after over twenty-
five years of arduous negotiations and was forced to accept various 
revisions and compromises.82 
Even the UN Human Rights Committee, whose influential 
jurisprudence Anaya cites often, has evinced a restrained approach 
to indigenous rights—at least until recently.83  Demonstrated harm 
                                                     
the adoption of the UNDRIP), the International Law Association found that 
“certain basic prerogatives that are essential in order to safeguard the identity and 
basic rights of indigenous peoples are today crystallized in the realm of customary 
international law.”  ILA Report, supra note 26, at 43. 
79 As for the indigenous right to “social welfare and development,” Anaya 
argues, “[a]lthough there is controversy about the outer bounds” of the right, “a 
core consensus exists that states are in some measure obligated to that end.”  
ANAYA, supra note 26, at 150.  The ILA Report of 2010 does not indicate that such a 
sweeping right forms part of customary international law.  ILA Report, supra note 
26, at 43. 
80 Interestingly, most are from Latin America.  See Ratifications of C169 – 
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989 (No. 169), INT’L LABOUR ORG., 
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INST
RUMENT_ID:312314 (last visited Oct. 17, 2013) (showing that Latin American 
states make up fifteen out of the twenty-two states that ratified the Convention). 
81 See, e.g., Sharon Venne, The New Language of Assimilation: A Brief Analysis of 
ILO Convention 169, 2 WITHOUT PREJUDICE 53 (1989), available at http://www. 
eaford.org/publications/3/WITHOUT%20Prejudice%20Vol_II_No2.pdf.  These 
disappointments led the Resolution of the Indigenous Peoples’ Preparatory 
Meeting (Geneva, 1989) to call “upon indigenous peoples all over the world to 
seize every opportunity to condemn the ILO and the revision process” and to 
urge “states not to ratify the revised convention.”  Id. at 67. 
82 See, e.g., Engle, On Fragile Architecture, supra note 26, at 144-51 (“[T]hat 
version included key compromises that . . . limited the right to self-determination 
as well as cultural and other collective rights.”); van Genugten, supra note 50, at 34 
(considering various state objections to the UNDRIP). 
83 See Poma Poma v. Peru, Views, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Commc’n 
No. 1457/2006, ¶ 7.7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 (Apr. 24 2009) 
(expressing notable support for “the way of life and culture” of the indigenous 
petitioner). 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
ANTKOWIAK_1.13 (2) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2014  2:49 PM 
134 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 35:1 
to cultural rights—such as logging or quarrying on traditional 
lands—is not enough to constitute an Article 27 violation; the 
Committee has required an outright “denial of the [authors’] right 
[to enjoy their own culture]” or an “impact [so] substantial that it 
does effectively deny” this right.84  From its inception, moreover, 
the Committee has refused to entertain claims of self-
determination under its individual communications procedure.85 
Major breakthroughs in binding international law owe to the 
Inter-American Court’s judgments, which were largely rendered 
since Anaya’s book was published.86  As discussed below, these 
                                                     
84 E.g., Mavlonov and Sa’di v. Uzbekistan, Views, U.N. Human Rights 
Committee, Commc’n No. 1334/2004, ¶ 8.7, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1334/2004 
(Mar. 19, 2009) (“[T]he Committee refers to its jurisprudence, where it has made 
clear that the question of whether Article 27 has been violated is whether the 
challenged restriction has an 'impact [...] [so] substantial that it does effectively 
deny to the [complainants] the right to enjoy their cultural rights […]’.”) 
(alteration in original); Länsman v. Finland, Views, U.N. Human Rights 
Committee, Commc’n No. 1023/2001, ¶¶ 10.1, 10.3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/83/D/1023/2001 (Apr. 15, 2005) (“[T]he effects of logging carried 
out . . . have not been shown to be serious enough as to amount to a denial of the 
authors’ right to enjoy their own culture in community with other members of 
their group under article 27 of the Covenant.”); Länsman v. Finland, Views, U.N. 
Human Rights Committee, Commc’n No. 511/1992, ¶¶ 9.4, 9.6, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (Oct. 26, 1994) (“[Q]uarrying . . . in the amount that has 
already taken place, does not constitute a denial of the authors’ right, under article 
27, to enjoy their own culture.”).  In another example of the Committee’s high 
threshold, even a Finnish district court had determined that logging would occur 
in an area “necessary for the authors to enjoy their cultural rights.” Äärelä and 
Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland, Views, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Commc’n No. 
779/1997, ¶ 7.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/73/D/779/1997 (Feb. 4, 1997).  The district 
court’s finding was subsequently disputed, however, and the Committee 
ultimately rejected an Article 27 violation.  Id. 
85 See, e.g., Poma Poma v. Peru, Views, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 
Commc’n No. 1457/2006, ¶ 6.3, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 (Apr. 24, 
2009) (“The Committee recalls its jurisprudence whereby the Optional Protocol 
provides a procedure under which individuals can claim that their individual 
rights have been violated, but that these rights do not include those set out in 
article 1 of the Covenant.”).  Note that: 
After long hesitation about the application of the provisions on self-
determination in Article 1 of the ICCPR to indigenous groups within 
independent states, the U.N. Human Rights Committee has begun, in 
dialogues with states parties under the reporting procedure, to express 
views under the self-determination rubric on the substantive terms of 
relationships between states and indigenous peoples. 
Kingsbury, supra note 39, at 228 (citing as examples Concluding Observations on 
Canadian state reports). 
86 Although Anaya, in fact, litigated the first case, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas 
Tingni v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001), available at 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss1/3
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decisions strongly back several facets of indigenous rights.  But the 
cases have also portrayed the wide ravine between state practice 
and supposed legal commitments—even in states, such as Ecuador 
and Paraguay, that ratified the ILO Convention.  Recently Anaya, 
as UN Special Rapporteur, has himself noted these distressing 
disparities in the context of extractive industries affecting ancestral 
lands.87  Thus, even when international tribunals or domestic laws 
shore up indigenous rights, implementation and enforcement often 
disappoint.88   
Another reservation to Anaya’s framework takes a step back:  
why endorse the human rights movement at all?  A persistent 
objection is that the international human rights paradigm channels 
Western imperialism and has little place in indigenous cultures.  
Supporting the paradigm, it is argued, privileges state sovereignty 
and individualistic philosophies that conflict with, and even 
directly threaten, indigenous concepts and forms of existence.89  
What results when indigenous traditions collide with central 
human rights principles, such as gender equality or democracy?  
The discourse of individual rights certainly places limits on 
indigenous concepts.  To illustrate, the ILO Convention provides: 
“These peoples shall have the right to retain their own customs 
and institutions, where these are not incompatible with 
fundamental rights defined by the national legal system and with 
internationally recognised human rights.”90 
                                                     
http://www.escr-net.org/sites/default/files/seriec_79_ing_0.pdf.  For an 
account of this litigation, see S. James Anaya & Maia S. Campbell, Gaining Legal 
Recognition of Indigenous Land Rights: The Story of the Awas Tingni Case in 
Nicaragua, in HUMAN RIGHTS ADVOCACY STORIES 117 (Deena R. Hurwitz & 
Margaret L. Satterthwaite eds., 2009). 
87 See supra Part I.  Also, Anaya found that “a minimum level of common 
understanding” is lacking among both states and corporate actors.  Extractive 
Industries Operating within or near Indigenous Territories, supra note 5, ¶ 68. 
88 See, e.g, van Genugten, supra note 50, at 47 (emphasizing “distance between 
the standards” on indigenous rights “legally binding or not—and day-to-day 
life”). 
89 See, e.g., KYMLICKA, supra note 26, at 291-92; THORNBERRY, supra note 26, at 
61–63; Engle, Indigenous Rights Claims, supra note 32, at 335; Engle, On Fragile 
Architecture, supra note 26, at 142, 151–52; Falk, supra note 47 at 24.  Kingsbury has 
written that five conceptual structures can clash with each other:  1) human rights 
claims; 2) minority claims; 3) self-determination claims; 4) historic sovereignty 
claims; and 5) claims as indigenous peoples.  Kingsbury, supra note 39, at 190. 
90 International Labour Conference, Convention Concerning Indigenous and 
Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, Convention 169, 28 I.L.M. 1384, art. 8(2), 
(1989).  As noted by Engle, “Indigenous rights are thus defined, explicitly or 
implicitly, with what the literature on colonial law refers to as the ‘repugnancy 
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Despite its limitations and dilemmas, many like Anaya have 
opted for the human rights approach over secessionist models.  In 
this vein, it is stated that indigenous communities are more 
focused on their lands, cultural integrity, and political 
empowerment than independent statehood.91  Perhaps this owes 
only to the fact that they are in crisis mode and can only react to 
the daily assaults upon their way of life.  But Karen Engle and 
others have observed that Latin American indigenous groups have 
rarely demanded external self-determination and that it is unlikely 
they will do so in the future.92 
The human rights paradigm continues to evolve in response to 
diverse indigenous claims.  Currently, it cannot be reduced to a 
right to cultural preservation, which requires only the tolerance of 
a people’s heritage.  In fact, the indigenous human rights 
movement has enjoyed much more success than minority rights 
frameworks in general, to the extent that such groups are seeking 
to portray themselves as ‘indigenous’ to obtain the expanding 
rights and protections associated with that status.93 
Anaya seizes upon this momentum and instills it with a 
normative force.  His five principles configuring self-determination 
for indigenous peoples, while not mutually exclusive, have been 
perennially emphasized by both indigenous advocates and 
international human rights bodies.  He does not avoid the 
indigenous mantra for self-determination; rather, he embraces it, 
                                                     
clause’.”  Engle, On Fragile Architecture, supra note 26, at 162.  That is, indigenous 
traditions are only allowed to a certain point.  Engle cautions that paragraphs (2) 
and (3) of Article 46 of the UNDRIP “threaten to function in the same way as the 
repugnancy clause.”  Id. 
91 See, e.g., Shelton, Self-Determination, supra note 4, at 62 (“[I]ndigenous and 
tribal peoples in Africa and the Americas have refrained from claiming 
independence, seeking instead to obtain internal self-determination and, in 
particular, control over their ancestral lands and resources.”); Kingsbury, supra 
note 39, at 220-24 (“Most of the groups participating in the international 
indigenous peoples’ movement . . . expect to continue in an enduring relationship 
with the state(s) in which they presently live.”). 
92 Engle, Indigenous Rights Claims, supra note 32, at 335.  
93 See KYMLICKA, supra note 26, at 284-87; Kingsbury, supra note 39, at 233 
(“The remarkable evolution of international norm-making to the point where 
numerous state governments accept some concept of self-determination as a 
principle broadly applicable to indigenous peoples has not been paralleled even 
remotely in relation to minorities in general.”); Gerald Torres, Indigenous Peoples, 
Afro-Indigenous Peoples and Reparations, in REPARATIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES: 
INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 117, 141 (Federico Lenzerini ed., 
2008). 
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and defines it in a manner that unifies rather than divides.  Self-
determination as “human freedom,” equality, and cultural 
prosperity resonates with many, especially when secession is not 
an indispensable demand.94 
But this ‘shared values’ conception of self-determination is not 
merely a careful strategy to soothe anxious governments.  For 
Anaya and like-minded colleagues, the choice is no longer between 
two extremes:  self-determination vs. human rights discourses, or 
secession vs. a limited right to culture.  Recasting self-
determination in this way, as a bundle of diverse rights, makes 
many more demands upon the state than a typical right-to-culture 
approach.  Anaya’s self-determination seeks to remediate broad 
social, economic, and political inequalities. 
3. THE CASE LAW OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT95 
The next Section will examine how the Inter-American Court 
has assessed cases involving indigenous and tribal territories.96  In 
                                                     
94 ANAYA, supra note 26, at 98-99. 
95 This Section focuses on cases dealing with indigenous and tribal lands.  
There are a number of other Court judgments that refer to indigenous and tribal 
rights, such as:  Rosendo Cantú v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216 (Aug. 31, 
2010); Fernández-Ortega et al. v. Mexico, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 215 (Aug. 30, 
2010); Chitay-Nech v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 212 (May 25, 2010); Tiu-Tojín 
v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 190 (Nov. 26, 2008); Escué-Zapata v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 165 (July 4, 2007); López-Álvarez 
v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations, and Costs,  Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 141 (Feb. 1, 2006); YATAMA v. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 127 (June 23, 
2005); Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 116 (Nov. 19, 2004);Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, 
Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 105 (Apr. 29, 2004); Bámaca-
Velásquez v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 70 
(Nov. 25, 2000); Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 15 (Sept. 10, 1993); Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, Merits, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 11 (Dec. 4, 1991).  
96 For general analysis of the Court’s indigenous rights judgments, see 
LAURENCE BURGORGUE-LARSEN & AMAYA ÚBEDA DE TORRES, THE INTER-AMERICAN 
COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS: CASE LAW AND COMMENTARY 497-528 (Rosalind 
Greenstein trans., 2011); Oswaldo Ruiz-Chiriboga, Los Pueblos Indígenas y Tribales 
ante la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos in LA CONVENCIÓN AMERICANA 
COMENTADA (forthcoming 2013); Isabel Madariaga Cuneo, The Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples and the Inter-American Human Rights System, 22 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 53 
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these judgments, along with lands and resources, the Court has 
discussed nondiscrimination, cultural integrity, social welfare and 
development, and self-government—what Anaya has called the 
five core principles for indigenous peoples’ self-determination.  
Over the years, the Court’s interpretation of these elements has 
varied.  The right to property in this context has undergone an 
especially interesting transformation:  from an individual right, to 
a tentative communal right, and finally to a configurative 
principle—similar to Anaya’s self-determination—that 
encompasses several key indigenous norms. 
3.1.   Introduction and Early Judgments 
The Inter-American human rights system has increasingly 
addressed the rights of indigenous communities.97  The Inter-
American Commission has decided petitions on the merits, issued 
precautionary measures, held thematic hearings, and published 
reports concerning indigenous peoples throughout the 
hemisphere.98  It has also referred various matters to the Inter-
                                                     
(2005); Jo M. Pasqualucci, The Evolution of International Indigenous Rights in the 
Inter-American Human Rights System, 6 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 281 (2006). 
97 For a concise and helpful account of the Inter-American human rights 
system, see Caroline Bettinger-López, The Inter-American Human Rights System: A 
Primer, 42 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 581 (2009). 
98 For more information, see Inter-American Commission Thematic Report, 
supra note 4 (examining in great detail the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples 
in the Americas); Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Democracy and Human Rights in 
Venezuela, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 54 (Dec. 30, 2009), available at 
http://www.cidh.org/countryrep/Venezuela2009eng/VE09.TOC.eng.htm 
(referring to indigenous rights in Venezuela); Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Access to 
Justice and Social Inclusion: The Road towards Strengthening Democracy in 
Bolivia, OEA/Ser.L/V/II, Doc. 34 (June 28, 2007), available at http://www.cidh. 
org/annualrep/2009eng/Chap.V.Toc.htm (referring to indigenous rights in 
Bolivia); Rapporteurship on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, INTER-AM. CT. H.R., 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/indigenous/default.asp (last visited Oct. 20, 2013) 
(presenting the work of both the Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
and the Commission as a whole  on this subject).  The Inter-American 
Commission has issued a number of significant decisions on indigenous petitions, 
among them:  Maya Indigenous Communities of Toledo Dist. v. Belize, Case 
12.053, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 40/04, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.122, doc. 5 
rev. 1 (2004), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2004eng/Belize. 
12053eng.htm (concluding that the State of Belize violated the petitioners’ rights 
to property, equality, and judicial protection enshrined in Articles XXII, II, and 
XVIII of the American Declaration); Dann v. United States, Case 11.140, Inter-Am. 
Comm’n H.R., Report No. 75/02, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.117, doc. 1 rev. 1 (2002), 
available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2002eng/USA.11140.htm (holding 
that the United States failed to ensure the petitioners’ right to property under 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss1/3
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American Court for binding resolution.99  In response, the Court 
has issued provisional measures and judgments with respect to 
indigenous rights.100  Though the Court has not provided a 
definitive and exhaustive definition of indigenous peoples, it has 
stressed that self-identification is important,101 and has offered 
characteristics that it finds significant:  peoples who own “social, 
cultural and economic traditions different from other sections of 
the national community,” who “[identify] themselves with their 
ancestral territories,” and who “[regulate] themselves, at least 
partially, by their own norms, customs, and traditions.”102 
In 2001, the Inter-American Court issued its first judgment on 
indigenous land rights, Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni v. 
Nicaragua.103  The State had granted the Sol del Caribe logging 
                                                     
conditions of equality, in violation of Articles II, XVIII, and XXIII of the American 
Declaration); Yanomami People v. Brazil, Case 7.615, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 12/85, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.66, doc. 10 rev. 1 (1985), available at 
http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/84.85eng/Brazil7615.htm (concluding that 
Brazil violated the petitioners’ rights to life, liberty, personal security, residence, 
movement and health, under Articles I, VIII, and XI, respectively, of the American 
Declaration). 
99 For recent analysis on a variety of issues concerning the Inter-American 
Court, see BURGORGUE-LARSEN & ÚBEDA DE TORRES, supra note 96; LA CONVENCIÓN 
AMERICANA COMENTADA (forthcoming 2013); JO M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE OF THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (2d ed. 2013); 
James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie Erin Brewer, Reevaluating Regional Human Rights 
Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American Court, 102 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 768 (2008); Alexandra Huneeus, Courts Resisting Courts: Lessons From The 
Inter-American Court’s Struggle To Enforce Human Rights, 44 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 493 
(2011); Gerald L. Neuman, Import, Export, and Regional Consent in the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT'L. L. 101 (2008). 
100 The Court’s provisional measures and judgments can be found at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr. 
101 See, e.g., Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 37 (Aug. 
24, 2010) (“[F]rom its name to its membership . . . the Court and the State must 
restrict themselves to respecting the corresponding decision made by the 
Community; in other words, the way in which it identifies itself.”). 
102 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 79 
(Nov. 28, 2007), interpreted by Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. C.) No. 185 (2008).  Note that 
these characteristics are contained in a judgment involving “tribal” peoples, not 
indigenous groups.  However, the descriptors (borrowed from Article 1, ILO 
Convention No. 169) refer to characteristics shared by tribal and indigenous 
peoples, according to the Court. 
103 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 79 (Aug. 31, 2001).  Back in 1991, with Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, the 
Court heard its first case concerning the Saramakas, a tribal population that was 
not indigenous to Suriname.  Aloeboetoe v. Suriname, Merits, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 11 (Dec. 4, 1991).  While it did not develop tribal or 
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company a concession to take timber from the community’s 
traditional lands.104  Despite provisions in Nicaraguan law that 
recognized communal properties on the Atlantic coast, the Awas 
Tingni lacked official title to their territory.105  In its assessment, the 
Court largely adopted the arguments of the Inter-American 
Commission and the petitioners—principally, that Article 21 of the 
American Convention (right to property) protected the Awas 
Tingni’s communal property rights.106 
In arriving at this conclusion, the Tribunal considered 
indigenous land tenure and property concepts.  It stated: 
ownership of the land is not centered on an individual but 
rather on the group and its community.  Indigenous 
groups, by the fact of their very existence, have the right to 
live freely in their own territory; the close ties of indigenous 
people with the land must be recognized and understood as 
the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, 
their integrity, and their economic survival.107 
The Court then held that “possession of the land should suffice 
for indigenous communities lacking real title to property of the 
land to obtain official recognition” of ownership.108  As a result, the 
State was ordered to demarcate the territory; also, in the meantime, 
the Court required Nicaragua to ensure that nothing—including 
                                                     
indigenous rights in the merits decision (the State had accepted responsibility for 
the alleged facts), in its reparations judgment the Tribunal took pains to examine 
the social structure of the Saramaka tribe in order to identify the victims’ 
successors.  Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 15, ¶¶ 59-66 (Sept. 10, 1993).  For more commentary on Mayagna 
(Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, see Anaya & Campbell, supra note 86; S. 
James Anaya & Claudio Grossman, The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua: A New 
Step in the International Law of Indigenous Peoples, 19 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1 
(2002); Richard J. Wilson & Jan Perlin, The Inter-American Human Rights System: 
Activities from Late 2000 Through October 2002, 18 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 651, 683-86 
(2003). 
104 Awas Tingni, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., No. 79, ¶ 153. 
105 Id. ¶¶ 103, 150. 
106 See id. ¶ 140 (summarizing the Commission’s arguments before the Court); 
Anaya & Campbell, supra note 86, at 131 (noting that the Commission adopted as 
its own the position that had been advanced by the Awas Tingni lawyers, 
including their position on the right to property, and that this was the legal theory 
ultimately accepted by the Court). 
107 Awas Tingni, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., No. 79, ¶ 149. 
108 Id. ¶ 151. 
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the actions of private parties—would “affect the existence, value, 
use or enjoyment of the property.”109 
Indigenous populations do not enjoy absolute rights to 
communal lands under this approach.  The American Convention’s 
right to property, like that of all international instruments, is not 
sacrosanct; it frequently yields to public interests, as discussed 
below.110  Since the 2005 judgment Yakye-Axa v. Paraguay, the Court 
has explicitly applied an evolving test to assess state interferences 
upon traditional lands, considering the restriction’s legality, 
necessity and proportionality with a “legitimate objective in a 
democratic society.”111   
In any event, Awas Tingni’s ruling on an indigenous right to 
communal property was a first for an international human rights 
court.  The African human rights courts112 were not yet in 
                                                     
109 Id. ¶ 153(b). 
110 See infra Part IV. 
111 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 127 (Nov. 28, 2007).  See also Yakye Axa Indigenous 
Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
125, ¶ 144 (June 17, 2005). 
112 The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was established by a 
protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.  Protocol to the 
African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, OAU Doc. OAU/LEG/MIN/AFCHPR/PROT.1 rev. 2 (entered 
into force Jan. 25, 2004), available at http://www.achpr.org/files/instruments 
/court-establishment/achpr_instr_proto_court_eng.pdf.  Though the Protocol 
entered into force in 2004, little progress was made, and the first judgment was 
not issued until the end of 2009.  Yogogombaye v. Republic of Senegal, Judgment, 
App. No. 001/2008, Afr. Ct. Human & Peoples’ Rights (Dec. 15, 2009), available at 
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/1-2008.pdf.  The African 
Union decided to fuse the Court with the AU Court of Justice.  African Union, 
Assembly/AU/Dec.45 (III) Rev.1, 3d Sess., (July 6-8, 2004), available at 
http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/ASSEMBLY_EN_30%20_%2031_JAN
UARY_%202005_AUC_THIRD_ORDINARY_SESSION.pdf.  This merger, creating 
the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, will be complete after its 
founding treaty enters into force.  African Union, Draft Protocol on Amendments 
to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 
art. 11(1) (May 15, 2012), available at http://africlaw.files.wordpress.com/2012/ 
05/au-final-court-protocol-as-adopted-by-the-ministers-17-may.pdf.  See generally 
GEORGE MUKUNDI WACHIRA, MINORITY RTS. GROUP INT’L, AFRICAN COURT ON 
HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS: TEN YEARS ON AND STILL NO JUSTICE (2008) available at 
http://www.refworld.org/pdfid/48e4763c2.pdf (discussing the development of 
the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the challenges it faces).  
Note that, in 2013, the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights issued an 
important order for provisional measures to protect an indigenous community 
that faced eviction from its traditional lands.  Afr. Comm’n on Human & Peoples’ 
Rights v. Kenya, Order of Provisional Measures, Afr. Ct. Human & Peoples’ 
Rights App. No. 006/2012 (Mar. 15, 2013), available at http://www.african-
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operation,113 and the European Court of Human Rights still has not 
rendered a comparable interpretation.114  The non-binding Human 
Rights Committee, for its part, does not even have competence to 
find violations of the right to property, because property was 
omitted from the ICCPR. 
Certainly, the Inter-American Court’s decision on indigenous 
lands was not assured.  Article 21 was one of the most contested 
provisions of the American Convention.  Negotiators debated 
several possibilities, including eliminating the right entirely.115 
Instead of an earlier proposal stating “everyone has the right to 
private property,”116 the final version provides, in part, “[e]veryone 
has the right to the use and enjoyment of his property.”117  The U.S. 
delegate had objected to these changes, opposing a more inclusive 
notion of property that would encompass “cooperative as well as 
private property.”118 
The final title of Article 21 in all official languages other than 
English remained “Right to Private Property,” despite the removal 
of the term “private” from the Article’s text, and the efforts of 
                                                     
court.org/en/images/documents/Orders-
Files/ORDER__of_Provisional_Measures_African_Union_v_Kenya.pdf. 
113 Of course, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights was 
functioning at the time.  For its relevant decision (non-binding) on the Ogoni 
People, issued only weeks after Awas Tingni, see Soc. & Econ. Rights Action Ctr. & 
Ctr. for Econ. & Soc. Rights v. Nigeria, Afr. Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, No. 155/96 (2001), available at http://www.achpr.org/files/sessions/30th 
/comunications/155.96/achpr30_155_96_eng.pdf. 
114 See EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, CULTURAL RIGHTS IN THE CASE-LAW 
OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS 19-21 (2011), available at 
http://www.echr.coe.int; Timo Koivurova, Jurisprudence of the European Court of 
Human Rights Regarding Indigenous Peoples: Retrospect and Prospects, 18 INT’L J. ON 
MINORITY & GRP. RTS. 1, 33-37 (2011). 
115 Juan Isaac Lovato, Report of the Rapporteur of Committee I, Doc. 60 (English) 
(Nov. 19, 1969).  
116 Minutes of the Second Plenary Session of the Inter-American Specialized 
Conference on Human Rights, 316, Am. Comm’n H.R., OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.2,  
Nov. 22, 1969 (Spanish) (translation by author), available at http://www.corteidh. 
or.cr/tablas/15388.pdf [hereinafter PLENARY].   
117 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human 
Rights, art. 21, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
118 Report of the United States Delegation to the Inter-American Specialized 
Conference on the Protection of Human Rights, Apr. 22, 1970, 9 I.L.M. 710, 727-28 
(1970).  Moreover, the delegate argued that there is more to property than its mere 
“use and enjoyment.” That is, by these terms, a state could allow use of property 
without ceding a full right to it.  PLENARY, supra note 116, at 446 (translation by 
author). 
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various delegates to change the title to “Right to the Use and 
Enjoyment of Property (Bienes).”119  The official English title is the 
broader “Right to Property,” notwithstanding the United States’ 
position favoring the expression ‘private property.’120  These 
inconsistencies were not explained in official documents.121 
In the Awas Tigni judgment, the Court selectively emphasized 
that “private” had been removed from the text of Article 21, 
without substantively addressing the discrepancies in titles.122  As 
the Court presented it, the American Convention’s terms fully 
allowed for the possibility of collective property.  Still, it decided to 
hedge its bets by recalling that “human rights treaties are live 
instruments whose interpretation must adapt to the evolution of 
the times and, specifically, to current living conditions.”123  For the 
Court, this interpretative principle would allow an expansion of 
Article 21 to include communal property, if it did not already form 
part of this right.124 
In further support of communal property, the Tribunal cited 
the Convention’s Article 29.  This provision forbids interpretations 
of the Convention that restrict “the enjoyment or exercise of any 
                                                     
119 PLENARY, supra note 116, at 289 (noting the delegations of Brazil, Chile, 
Ecuador, Guatemala, Uruguay and Venezuela were involved in this proposal).  
See also Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, 2001 Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶¶139-40 n.55 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
120 See Report of the United States Delegation to the Inter-American 
Specialized Conference on the Protection of Human Rights, supra note 118 (“By 
deleting the word ‘private’ . . . the article would be broader and would include 
cooperative as well as private property.”). 
121 See Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶139-40 n.55 
(Aug. 31, 2001); Jo M. Pasqualucci, International Indigenous Land Rights: A Critique 
of the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in Light of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 51, 65 (2009-
2010) [hereinafter Pasqualucci, International Indigenous Land Rights] (“The adjective 
‘private’ was subsequently deleted without explanation.”). 
122 Awas Tingni, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 145. 
123 Id. ¶ 146. 
124 The Court’s “evolutive” mode of interpretation derives from the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights.  See, e.g., Tyrer v. United Kingdom, App. 
No. 5856/72, Eur. Ct. H.R., ¶ 31 (1978) (“[T]he Convention is a living instrument 
which . . . must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions.”).  According 
to the Inter-American Tribunal, such an approach “is consistent with the general 
rules of treaty interpretation established in the 1969 Vienna Convention.”  The 
Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of the Guarantees 
of the Due Process of Law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A), No. 16 ¶ 114 (Oct. 1, 1999). 
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right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State 
Party or by virtue of another convention to which one of the said 
states is a party.”125  Because Nicaraguan law, including its 
Constitution, recognized communal property, the Court reasoned 
that it could not exclude this dimension from Article 21.126 
These assorted lines of reasoning, each persuasive to varying 
degrees, nevertheless clouded the ultimate meaning of Awas Tigni.  
Would the Court have affirmed communal property in the 
American Convention if not already established in Nicaraguan 
domestic law?127  At one point in the judgment, it made a 
significant pronouncement:  “[t]he terms of an international human 
rights treaty have an autonomous meaning”; thus, “they cannot be 
made equivalent to the meaning given to them in domestic law.”128  
But the Court kept referring back to domestic law when 
interpreting Article 21, sending a mixed message.  In short, an 
insecure Tribunal, in efforts to establish a communal right to 
property, provided a number of rationales.  Yet a crucial point, 
whether this right formed a permanent and unconditional 
component of Article 21, was left uncertain. 
With the subsequent judgment Moiwana Village v. Suriname, the 
Court temporarily filled this gap in understanding.129  In 1986, 
government and militia forces attacked Moiwana Village on the 
suspicion that community members were aligned with an 
insurgency movement.130  During the attack, “state agents and 
collaborators killed at least 39 defenseless [Moiwana residents], 
including infants, women and the elderly, and wounded many 
others.”131  Survivors fled the region and refused to return.132 
                                                     
125 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 117, at art. 29(b). 
126 Awas Tingni, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 148. 
127 See Pasqualucci, International Indigenous Land Rights, supra note 121, at 65 
(“Some doubt arises, however, whether the Inter-American Court will 
consistently recognize indigenous rights to communal property if the state's 
domestic law does not provide for communal land ownership, and the state has 
not ratified other treaties that provide for collective indigenous land ownership.”). 
128 Awas Tingni, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 146. 
129 Moiwana Cmty v. Suriname (Moiwana Village), Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124 
(June 15, 2005). 
130 Id. ¶¶ 86(12), 86(15), 86(27). 
131 Id. ¶ 86(15). 
132 Id. ¶¶ 86(15), 86(19). 
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Among other violations, the Court found a breach of the 
community members’ right to communal property.133  Yet the 
analysis did not rely upon domestic law or other international 
instruments.  In fact, earlier in the judgment, the Tribunal had 
observed that Suriname’s legislation omitted collective property 
rights.134  Thus, Moiwana Village demonstrated that Article 21 
unconditionally embraced communal rights to property. 
The judgment rendered another notable interpretation of the 
Convention’s right to property.  The Moiwana villagers were not 
an indigenous population, but rather had settled in the area in the 
late nineteenth century.135  According to the case’s record, they 
were tribal peoples called Maroons, who descended from Africans 
forcefully taken to the region two-hundred years before.136  The 
Moiwana inhabitants, known as N’djuka, were one of six Maroon 
groups.137 
The Court found that the N’djuka’s relationship to their 
territory contained many of the cultural, spiritual, and material 
elements discerned in Awas Tigni.  It held that the community 
members: 
possess an “all-encompassing relationship” to their 
traditional lands, and their concept of ownership regarding 
that territory is not centered on the individual, but rather 
on the community as a whole. Thus, this Court’s holding 
with regard to indigenous communities and their 
communal rights to property under Article 21 . . . must also 
apply to the tribal Moiwana community members: their 
traditional occupancy of Moiwana Village and its 
surrounding lands . . . should suffice to obtain State 
recognition of their ownership.138 
From this point on, the Court has considered indigenous and 
other “tribal” populations equivalently with respect to land rights, 
at least if they demonstrate an “all-encompassing relationship” 
                                                     
133 Id. ¶ 135. 
134 Id. ¶ 86(5). 
135 Id. ¶ 86(1)–86(3). 
136 Id.  
137 Id.  
138 Id. ¶ 133 (footnote omitted).  
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with their territories.139  Of course, the decision prompts questions 
about the minimal requirements for such a relationship and 
‘traditional occupancy.’  Once these elements are proven to the 
Court’s satisfaction, they bring significant consequences, requiring 
property rights over potentially large and valuable tracts of land.  I 
will revisit this issue below in discussions on Sawhoyamaxa 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay and Saramaka People v. Suriname, 
another case concerning Maroon populations. 
3.2. The Paraguayan Trilogy of Cases: Reclaiming Lands and Vida 
Digna 
In Yakye Axa Community v. Paraguay, petitioners endured 
twelve years of delays while they attempted to reclaim their 
traditional lands through state administrative procedures.140  Until 
their petition was resolved, they moved onto an area adjacent to 
their ancestral territories.  However, the temporary settlement did 
not allow for the practice of traditional subsistence activities.141  
Housing, sanitary, and health conditions were gravely deficient.142 
The Court began its assessment by recognizing the transversal 
nature of the equality principle, contained in Article 24 of the 
American Convention.  Similar to Anaya’s broad 
nondiscrimination principle, the Tribunal indicated that to ensure 
the Convention’s rights to indigenous peoples, states “must take 
into account the specific characteristics that differentiate the 
members of the indigenous peoples from the general population 
and that constitute their cultural identity.”143  The indigenous 
cultural identity has a direct bearing on the Convention’s “scope 
                                                     
139 The Court has referred to Afro-Latin populations such as the Saramaka as 
“tribal peoples” that are “not indigenous to the region, but that share similar 
characteristics with indigenous peoples, such as having social, cultural and 
economic traditions different from other sections of the national community, 
identifying themselves with their ancestral territories, and regulating themselves, 
at least partially, by their own norms, customs, and traditions.”  Saramaka People 
v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment,  
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 79 (Nov. 28, 2007), interpreted by Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 185 (2008). 
140 Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125 (June 17, 2005). 
141 Id. ¶ 164. 
142 Id.  
143 Id. ¶ 51. 
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and content,” and leads to special state obligations and measures 
of protection.144  
The Tribunal later discussed state obligations to ensure the 
right to life (Convention Article 4):  “the State has the duty to take 
positive, concrete measures geared toward fulfillment of the right 
to a decent life, especially in the case of persons who are vulnerable 
and at risk,” such as indigenous peoples.145  Here, the Court first 
applied its concept of “vida digna” (translated in the judgment as 
“decent life”) to indigenous populations.  Considering the 
community’s abysmal living conditions and insufficient efforts by 
Paraguay to alleviate them, it found the State responsible for a 
violation of the right to vida digna; as a result, Article 4 of the 
Convention was breached.146 
Because of Paraguay’s ineffective legal procedures for land 
claims, the Court held that the community’s right to property was 
also violated.147  Unfortunately, however, Yakye Axa muddled 
Moiwana’s clear precedent on communal property and Article 21.  
The judgment alternately referred to the ILO Convention, which 
Paraguay had ratified, and domestic law to establish the contours 
of the petitioners’ right to property in the case.148  But the Tribunal 
should have clarified Article 21’s minimum protections, the core 
content that can then be augmented by a state’s national law and 
international commitments. 
Another notable aspect to Yakye Axa was the Court’s first 
recognition of the “right to cultural identity.”149  This right, which 
the Tribunal describes as a “basic” right, is not expressly named in 
the American Convention.150  The judgment did not compare the 
right to the cultural integrity norm of Article 27 of the ICCPR, nor 
did it otherwise explain its content—except by noting the obvious: 
that disregarding indigenous lands “could affect” it.151  Separate 
opinions by Court judges hailed the right’s recognition, and 
                                                     
144 Id.  
145 Id. ¶ 162. 
146 Id. ¶ 176. 
147 Id. ¶¶ 155-156. 
148 Id. ¶¶ 124-155. 
149 Id. ¶ 147. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. ¶¶ 147, 167. 
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considered that it was linked to several provisions of the 
Convention.152  
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay also concerned 
an indigenous community that sought to reclaim its lands while 
suffering harrowing living conditions.  Sawhoyamaxa affirms 
Moiwana’s unconditional acceptance of communal property as part 
of the American Convention.153  It also provides a helpful synthesis 
of the Court’s case law on ancestral lands.  In doing so, the 
judgment contemplates additional, and essential, facets of this 
dynamic:  conflicts between private landowners and indigenous 
groups, as well as disputes between indigenous communities.  
First, according to Sawhoyamaxa, “traditional possession” by 
indigenous communities “has equivalent effects to those of a state-
granted full property title,” and thus entitles such communities to 
demand state titling of their collective properties.154  Second, 
communities 
who have unwillingly left their traditional lands, or lost 
possession thereof, maintain property rights thereto, even 
though they lack legal title, unless the lands have been 
lawfully transferred to third parties in good faith; [Third, 
those] who have unwillingly lost possession of their lands, 
when those lands have been lawfully transferred to 
innocent third parties, are entitled to restitution thereof or 
to obtain other lands of equal extension and quality.155 
As a result, current possession is not at all necessary for indigenous 
communities to assert their land rights. 
Sawhoyamaxa also attempts to identify what constitutes 
‘traditional possession’ of ancestral lands; as long as this special 
                                                     
152 See id. (partially dissenting opinion of Judge Abreu Burelli); id. (dissenting 
opinion of Judges Cançado Trindade and Ventura Robles).  These opinions 
supported the right to cultural identity, and dissented on other matters.  
153 See Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 120 (Mar. 29, 2006) 
(“This notion of ownership and possession of land does not necessarily conform 
to the classic concept of property, but deserves equal protection under Article 21 
of the American Convention.  Disregard for specific versions of use and 
enjoyment of property, springing from the culture, uses, customs, and beliefs of 
each people, would be tantamount to holding that there is only one way of using 
and disposing of property, which, in turn, would render protection under Article 
21 of the Convention illusory for millions of persons.”). 
154 Id. ¶ 128. 
155 Id.  
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connection exists, the community maintains a right to (re)claim its 
territory.  The “unique” indigenous relationship with land “may be 
expressed in different ways, depending on the particular 
indigenous people involved and the specific circumstances 
surrounding it.”156  The Tribunal offered examples:  “spiritual or 
ceremonial ties; settlements or sporadic cultivation; seasonal or 
nomadic gathering, hunting and fishing; the use of natural 
resources associated with their customs and any other element 
characterizing their culture.”157 
Yet such descriptors are extremely broad, and they do not 
necessarily distinguish indigenous populations from Latin 
American groups such as the Maroons of Suriname and certain 
other Afro-Latin populations.158  Dinah Shelton has also pointed 
out that the Sawhoyamaxa judgment could incentivize state 
assimilation policies, if governments wished to weaken traditional 
ties to resource-rich lands.159  Yet the Court does specify that, if 
communities have been “prevented” from maintaining such ties 
“for reasons beyond their control,” then “restitution rights shall be 
deemed to survive until said hindrances disappear.”160  
Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community finalizes the trilogy of 
cases against Paraguay on displaced indigenous peoples.161  Like 
Sawhoyamaxa, the judgment bolsters communal rights to land 
under Article 21.162  The petitioners, a nomadic people, claimed 
over 41 square miles, or 10,700 hectares, of the Paraguayan 
Chaco.163  In support of their historical use of the land, they 
                                                     
156 Id. ¶ 131. 
157 Id.  
158 See, e.g., KYMLICKA, supra note 26, at 250, 300 (noting that minority groups 
often face different “standard threats”); RICHARD PRICE, RAINFOREST WARRIORS: 
HUMAN RIGHTS ON TRIAL 238 (2011) (“[A] one-size-fits-all argument for Afro-
Descendants in the Americas . . . belies the variety of historical and ethnographic 
realities these diverse peoples represent.”). 
159 See Dinah Shelton, Reparations for Indigenous Peoples: The Present Value of 
Past Wrongs in REPARATIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, supra note 93, at 47, 69 
[hereinafter Shelton, Present Value of Past Wrongs]. 
160 Sawhoyamaxa, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 132.  The Court gives examples of 
impermissible “hindrances” that would prevent communities from maintaining 
their ties: “acts of violence or threats.”  Shelton rightly states that these examples 
could set the bar too high and allow for some types of state assimilation 
programs.  See Shelton, Present Value of Past Wrongs, supra note 159, at 69. 
161 Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214 (Aug. 24, 2010). 
162 Id. ¶¶ 85-87. 
163 Id. ¶ 68. 
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presented witness testimony, expert statements, and 
anthropological reports, whose findings were not challenged.164  
Paraguay only responded that the land’s restitution was 
impossible, since it now belonged to private parties, and proposed 
alternate properties.165 
In fact, the Court has not yet denied a claim that occupation 
was “in accordance with customary practices,” nor have states 
offered much expert opinion to challenge such a finding.166  Until 
states contest this essential point more vigorously, the Tribunal 
may able to maintain the vague guidelines set out in Sawhoyamaxa.  
In Xákmok Kásek, absent substantive objections, the Court found 
that the territories in question were the community’s “traditional 
lands and . . . are the most suitable for its settlement.”167 
In finding a property violation, the Court noted damage to the 
community’s “cultural identity” owing to its severance from 
ancestral lands and natural resources.168  In this way, the Tribunal 
explicitly linked cultural identity to Article 21.  The Court 
reinforces this connection in the judgments of Saramaka People v. 
Suriname and Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, 
discussed below. 
The Tribunal also returned to the concept of vida digna 
(translated as “right to a decent existence” in Xákmok Kásek).169  It 
assessed a variety of conditions at the community’s temporary 
settlement, such as access to water, food, health care, and 
education.  The Court concluded that Paraguay did not furnish 
“the basic services to protect the right to a decent life of a specific 
                                                     
164 Id. ¶¶ 103-106. 
165 Id. ¶ 106. 
166 In Saramaka People v. Suriname, Suriname used expert testimony but the 
evidence presented did not appear to relate directly to this subject.  Saramaka 
People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶¶ 64-65 (Nov. 28, 2007), interpreted 
by Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 185 (2008).  In Xákmok Kásek Indigenous 
Community, the State’s expert, Sergio Iván Braticevic, actually confirmed the 
“traditional character” of the lands for the petitioners.  Xákmok Kásek, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. ¶ 102. 
167 Xákmok Kásek , Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 107. 
168 Id. ¶¶ 174-182.  The Court also reiterated that states must take into account 
the fundamental importance of ancestral territories when deciding land conflicts.  
Indigenous peoples’ distinct relationship with their territories also must generally 
inform a state’s agrarian policies; that is, productivity cannot serve as the only 
government priority for lands.  Id. ¶ 182. 
169 Id. ¶¶ 193-217. 
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group of individuals in these conditions of special, real and 
immediate risk.”170  In consequence, Article 4 was breached with 
respect to “all the members” of the Xákmok Kásek Community.171  
Furthermore, the Court found an additional Article 4 violation for 
thirteen deaths, which were traced to the precarious health 
conditions.  That is, the State was held directly responsible for the 
deaths, as it did not adopt the necessary measures “within its 
powers, that could reasonably be expected to prevent or to avoid 
the risk to the right to life.”172  
3.3. Resource Extraction Revisited: Saramaka and Sarayaku 
3.3.1. Saramaka People v. Suriname 
In 2007, the Maroons returned to the Tribunal with Saramaka 
People v. Suriname.173  In Saramaka, the Court analyzes resource 
extraction from communal lands to a far more detailed extent than 
in the Awas Tingni judgment.  The petitioners argued that the 
State’s concessions for logging and mining—granted to private 
companies on traditional lands, without adequately consulting the 
community—violated several rights.174  As in Moiwana, Suriname 
                                                     
170 Id. ¶ 217. 
171 Id.  
172 Id. ¶ 234. 
173 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 (Nov. 28, 
2007), interpreted by Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 185 (2008).  For more 
commentary on the Saramaka judgment, see PRICE, supra note 158; Lisl Brunner, 
The Rise of Peoples’ Rights in the Americas: The Saramaka People Decision of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, 7 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 699 (2007); Ariel E. Dulitzky, 
When Afro-Descendants Became “Tribal Peoples”: The Inter-American Human Rights 
System and Rural Black Communities, 15 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 29 (2010); 
Lillian Aponte Miranda, Uploading the Local: Assessing the Contemporary 
Relationship Between Indigenous Peoples’ Land Tenure Systems and International 
Human Rights Law Regarding the Allocation of Traditional Lands and Resources in Latin 
America, 10 OR. REV. INT’L L. 419 (2008); Pasqualucci, International Indigenous Land 
Rights, supra note 121; Gaetano Pentassuglia, Towards a Jurisprudential Articulation 
of Indigenous Land Rights, 22 EUR. J. INT'L L. 165 (2011); Richard Price, Contested 
Territory: The Victory of the Saramaka People vs. Suriname, SIMPÓSIO INTERNACIONAL: 
TERRITÓRIOS SENSÍVEIS: DIFERENÇA, AGÊNCIA E TRANSGRESSÃO (June 15, 2009), 
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/tablas/r22784.pdf; Dinah Shelton, Human 
Rights and the Environment, 18 Y.B. INT’L ENVTL. L. 163, 168-69 (2007); Ward, supra 
note 71. 
174 Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 124 (2007). 
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had not officially recognized the communal rights of indigenous 
and tribal populations over their lands and resources.175 
The Court began by studying the communal right to property 
under Article 21.  Despite its confirmed case law on the point, and 
the fact that Moiwana had resolved the same issue with respect to 
similar communities, the Tribunal essentially started from scratch.  
Even more surprising was its line of reasoning.  Suriname had 
ratified both the ICCPR and the ICESCR; at the urging of 
petitioners, the Court turned to Common Article 1 on self-
determination and the ICCPR’s Article 27 on cultural integrity.176  
The Tribunal recalled that it could use these instruments to 
interpret the right to property following Article 29(b), the provision 
that prevents restrictive interpretations of Convention rights.177 
For the Court, reading all of these terms together 
supports an interpretation of Article 21 of the 
American Convention to the effect of calling for the 
right of members of indigenous and tribal 
communities to freely determine and enjoy their 
own social, cultural and economic development, 
which includes the right to enjoy their particular 
spiritual relationship with the territory they have 
traditionally used and occupied.178 
This view radically expands the content of Article 21.  Not only 
does the provision protect communal property rights, but it now 
would effectively become the self-determination norm of the 
American Convention, which does not—at least expressly—
contain this right. 
Like Anaya’s configurative principle of self-determination, the 
Saramaka judgment attributed a number of rights to Article 21.  
These include the many rights associated with the ability “to freely 
determine and enjoy their own social, cultural and economic 
development.”179  Later in the judgment, the Court offered another 
                                                     
175 Id. ¶¶ 98-99. 
176 See Pleadings, Motions and Evidence of the Victim’s Representatives, ¶ 71, 
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172 (Nov. 28, 2007) (urging the 
Court to consider these UN human rights instruments), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr. 
177 Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 93 (2007). 
178 Id. ¶ 95. 
179 Id.  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol35/iss1/3
ANTKOWIAK_1.13 (2) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/23/2014  2:49 PM 
2013] RIGHTS, RESOURCES, AND RHETORIC 153 
endorsement of self-determination.  It held that states should 
ensure that indigenous and tribal communities “may continue 
living their traditional way of life, and that their distinct cultural 
identity, social structure, economic system, customs, beliefs and 
traditions are respected, guaranteed and protected.”180  Still, the 
Tribunal appeared to stop short of recognizing all elements of the 
self-determination definition found in the ICCPR, ICESCR, and the 
UNDRIP.  Those instruments also protect the ability to “freely 
determine . . . political status.”181 
The protection of the Saramaka communal lands under Article 
21 was “necessary to guarantee their very survival”; furthermore, 
the Court held that the right to the land itself would be 
“meaningless” without rights to the natural resources therein.182  
As a result, Article 21 also protects those “resources traditionally 
used and necessary for the very survival, development and 
continuation of such people’s way of life.”183  Notably, to recognize 
the special importance of lands and resources to indigenous 
populations, the Saramaka judgment added an additional condition 
to its usual proportionality test for property interferences:  the state 
restriction cannot constitute “a denial of [the community’s] 
traditions and customs in a way that endangers the very survival 
of the group and of its members.”184 
To comply with this condition, following Saramaka, states must 
implement at least three “safeguards.”185  First, “the State must 
ensure the effective participation of the members of [the 
community], in conformity with their customs and traditions, 
regarding any development, investment, exploration or extraction 
plan . . . within [their] territory.”186  Second, the state must 
guarantee that the community will receive “a reasonable benefit” 
                                                     
180 Id. ¶ 121. 
181 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, G.A. Res. 61/295, art. 1, 
U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp. No. 53, U.N. Doc. A/Res/61/295, at 3 (Sept. 13, 
2007); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. 
GAOR 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 53 (Dec. 16, 1966); 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, 
U.N. GAOR 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/6316, at 49 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
182 Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 122 (2007). 
183 Id.  
184 Id. ¶ 128.  
185 Id. ¶ 129. 
186 Id.  
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from any such project.187  Third, states must prevent concessions 
“unless and until independent and technically capable entities, 
with the State’s supervision, perform a prior environmental and 
social impact assessment.”188  These safeguards will be examined 
below (see infra Part IV).  At this point, it is sufficient to note that 
the safeguards reflect components of Anaya’s self-determination 
principle, such as social development and self-government.   
Ultimately, however, Saramaka’s limited acknowledgment of 
self-determination is undermined by its emphasis on ‘cultural 
survival.’  On numerous occasions in the judgment, the Tribunal 
justified the right to communal property as “essential for the 
survival of their way of life.”189  Similar phrases were also 
employed, such as “necessary for their physical and cultural 
survival.”190  On the one hand, such remarks were not overstated; 
they emphasized the fundamental nature of lands and resources to 
the Saramaka people. 
Yet the Court also used the term “survival” in a different way:  
as a benchmark for state obligations, leading to invidious 
consequences.191  It holds that only those lands and resources 
“essential for the survival of their way of life” are protected under 
Article 21.192  As a basis for such statements, the Saramaka judgment 
cited to the UN Human Rights Committee and its interpretations 
of Article 27.  The Committee’s jurisprudence, especially those 
cases referenced by the Inter-American Tribunal, set out a 
conservative view of cultural integrity.  In fact, the Saramaka Court 
interpreted one decision, Länsman et al. v. Finland, to allow states 
                                                     
187 Id. 
188 Id.  
189 See, e.g., id. ¶ 123. 
190 Id. ¶ 122. 
191 In subsequent proceedings to clarify the judgment, the petitioners 
complained that the State had taken advantage of the Court’s “survival” 
terminology.  They charged that Suriname had interpreted it to mean that 
commercial projects merely must not endanger lives.  While the Court replied that 
“survival” means “much more than physical survival,” such an obvious 
pronouncement is no great consolation for indigenous and tribal peoples, and 
doubts linger as to what precisely remains protected.  Saramaka People v. 
Suriname, Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 185, ¶ 37 (Aug. 
12, 2008).  Adding to the confusion, the 2007 judgment in English occasionally 
translates “subsistencia” (subsistence) as “survival.”  See, e.g., Saramaka, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 96, 120 (2007). 
192 Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 123 (2007) (emphasis added). 
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“to pursue development activities that limit the rights of a minority 
culture as long as the activity does not fully extinguish the indigenous 
people’s way of life.”193 
Saramaka’s interpretations permit commercial projects that do 
not “fully extinguish” a way of life, or that do not endanger the 
“very survival” of a people.  Such minimalist standards collide 
with the Court’s radical affirmation of Article 21 as a self-
determination principle “calling for [a people’s right] to freely 
determine and enjoy their own social, cultural and economic 
development.”194  They also conflict with earlier case law, which, 
inter alia, required special measures of protection to achieve a vida 
digna for indigenous populations. 
Anaya’s cultural integrity norm, a pillar of his self-
determination principle, demands more than mere cultural 
survival and defense.  Similarly, the Court was building the right 
to self-determination in Saramaka.  It should have conceived of 
cultural survival as only the first step on the path toward cultural 
integrity.  Cultural integrity, along with other rights, then leads to 
a complete architecture for self-determination.  Yet, when 
translating these concepts into its standards for the judgment, the 
Tribunal remained on the first step.195 
3.3.2. Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador 
Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, handed down in 
2012, concerned an indigenous community from the Ecuadorian 
Amazon.  While the State had granted a communal property title 
to the Sarayaku, it reserved a number of rights, including rights to 
                                                     
193 Id. ¶ 126 n.126 (emphasis added). The HRC actually did not make this 
statement.  See Länsman v. Finland, Views, U.N. Human Rights Committee, 
Commc’n No. 511/1992, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (Oct. 26, 1994). 
194 Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 95 (2007). 
195 The discussion on equality principles also did not lead far.  The judgment 
paid lip service to a state’s “positive obligation to adopt special measures that 
guarantee members of indigenous and tribal peoples the full and equal exercise of 
their right to the territories they have traditionally used and occupied.”  Id. ¶ 91.  
See also id. ¶ 85.  But, in the end, the decision did not depict equality and cultural 
integrity principles building a robust notion of self-determination.  Rather than an 
order to ensure “the full and equal exercise” of their numerous rights, the 
judgment ultimately resembled a modest instruction that Suriname simply respect 
the Saramakas’ cultural survival. See Dulitzky, supra note 173, at 71-72 (criticizing 
the Court’s restrained approach on discrimination issues).  
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subsurface natural resources.196  Ecuador eventually signed a 
contract with a foreign company to initiate oil exploration.197  The 
Sarayaku resisted these activities, which damaged their lands and 
threatened their way of life.198 
The judgment began by confirming that Article 21 protected 
rights to communal property; fortunately, this permanent aspect of 
the Convention is no longer in doubt.  Also of great significance, 
the Court, for the first time, held that the indigenous community 
itself suffered the collective property violation.199  The Tribunal 
decided that the Sarayaku, as a group, experienced other rights 
violations as well.200  In previous judgments, the Court had only 
found violations “to the detriment of the [individual] members” of 
a community, even if the right to communal property was 
breached.201  Such a formulation recognized the Convention’s 
Article 1, the central provision that obligates States Parties to 
respect and ensure the treaty’s rights to “all persons subject to their 
jurisdiction”—”person” defined as “every human being.”202  In this 
sharp break with the past, the Sarayaku Court has apparently 
adopted a wider definition of “person,” following the views of 
                                                     
196 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and 
Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶¶ 61-72 (June 27, 
2012). 
197 Id. ¶ 64. 
198 Id. ¶¶ 92-123.   
199 Id. ¶ 341(2).  See also Lisl Brunner & Karla Quintana, The Duty to Consult in 
the Inter-American System: Legal Standards after Sarayaku, 16 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. 35 
(Nov. 28, 2012), available at http://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/insight 
121128.pdf (discussing, briefly, the outcome and some implications of the  
Sarayaku judgment).  Note that, because of a translation error (in English version), 
Xákmok Kásek appears to be the first judgment to consider the indigenous 
community per se as victim.  Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 337 (Aug. 24, 2010).  But the original text in 
Spanish actually refers to the individual members of the community. 
200 See Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 341 (“The State is responsible for the 
violation of the right to judicial guarantees and to judicial protection recognized 
in Articles 8(1) and 25 of the American Convention . . . to the detriment of the 
Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku.”).  The Court’s findings also shaped its 
reparations orders, as remedies were directed to the community as a whole.  Id.  
201 See Xákmok Kásek, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 170 (concurring opinion of Judge 
Vio Grossi) (noting that the Court “declared violations of human rights to the 
detriment of the members of the indigenous peoples, without, however, doing so, 
at least directly and explicitly with regard to them as such; in other words, as a 
whole or as different ethnic groups or human collectivities with international legal 
personality”). 
202 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 117, at art. 1. 
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bodies such as the U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights.203 
The Court distanced itself from other key aspects of Saramaka.  
Common Article 1 of the ICCPR and ICESCR no longer served as a 
reference point, despite the fact that Ecuador had ratified both 
treaties well before the case’s facts.204  In fact, the Court avoided the 
term ‘self-determination’ altogether.205  The judgment 
acknowledged Saramaka’s three safeguards:  effective participation, 
reasonable benefits, and the impact assessment.  Nevertheless, it 
did not examine the concept of benefits.  Also of deep concern, the 
Court’s standard on consent was completely ignored.  Saramaka 
had held that, in specific circumstances, the “effective 
participation” of the indigenous community actually required the 
group’s consent for a project to move forward.206 
Still, Sarayaku devoted a great deal of attention to the baseline 
of effective participation:  the state obligation to consult indigenous 
populations before projects begin.  Saramaka had already asserted 
that this constituted a “right to consultation” for communities 
whose traditional lands were threatened.207  The Court in Sarayaku 
noted that Ecuadorian law “fully recognized this right.”208  
Sarayaku then surveyed regional law on this subject, and 
recognized its status in international instruments such as the ILO 
No. 169.  The Court’s assessment sought to establish the right to 
consultation not only as a norm protected in the American 
Convention, but also as a “general principle of international 
law.”209 
                                                     
203 See Comm. on Econ., Soc. and Cultural Rights, Gen. Comment No. 21: 
Right of Everyone to Take Part in Cultural Life, ¶ 9, UN Doc. E/C.12/GC/21, 
(Dec. 21, 2009) (“[T]he Committee recognizes that the term ‘everyone’ in the first 
line of article 15 may denote the individual or the collective . . . .”). 
204 Common Article 1 was only mentioned in a footnote.  Sarayaku, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. ¶ 171 n.223.  
205 In a footnote, the Court only observed that Ecuador’s Constitution 
recognizes the right to self-determination.  Id. ¶ 217 n.288.   
206 See Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 134 (Nov. 
28, 2007), interpreted by Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 185 (2008) (“[R]egarding 
large-scale development or investment projects that would have a major impact 
within Saramaka territory, the State has a duty, not only to consult with the 
Saramakas, but also to obtain their free, prior, and informed consent . . . .”). 
207 Id. § E.2.a (“Right to consultation, and where applicable, a duty to obtain 
consent.”) (emphasis added). 
208 Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 168. 
209 Id. ¶ 164. 
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After portraying it as such, Sarayaku expanded the applicability 
of this principle.  Saramaka had mainly focused on the state 
obligation to ensure consultations before resource extraction and 
other forms of commercial development.  But Sarayaku 
underscored that the right to consultation extends to “any 
administrative and legislative measures that may affect 
[indigenous and tribal] rights, as recognized under domestic and 
international law.”210  Anaya also urges broad consultation 
requirements “in all matters affecting” indigenous peoples, not 
merely property rights.211  As noted earlier, he considers 
consultation and participation essential components of “self-
government”—one of his primary norms constituting self-
determination.212 
Also of interest is Sarayaku’s return to the “right to cultural 
identity,” originally articulated in Yakye Axa.213  Sarayaku held that 
the right to cultural identity is a “fundamental right . . . [that] 
should be respected in a multicultural, pluralistic and democratic 
society.”214  The judgment tracked the development of the principle 
in global instruments, such as the UNDRIP and the ILO 
Convention, as well as in international case law.  For the Tribunal, 
consultations with indigenous communities on any issue relevant 
to their cultural or social life will protect and ensure their collective 
right to cultural identity.215  The judgment concluded that the 
community’s lack of participation with respect to the oil 
exploration activities led to severe consequences for its lands and 
cultural identity.216 
Sarayaku traces many of these norms—cultural identity, social 
welfare, lands and resources, political structure—back to Article 
                                                     
210 Id. ¶ 166.  See also id. ¶¶ 160, 167. 
211 ANAYA, supra note 26, at 156. 
212 Id. at 150. 
213 Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 217. 
214 Id.  
215 See id. (“This means that States have an obligation to ensure that 
indigenous peoples are properly consulted on matters that affect or could affect 
their cultural and social life, in accordance with their values, traditions, customs 
and forms of organization.”).   
216 See id. ¶ 220 (noting that the lack of consultation with and lack of respect 
for the indigenous peoples “caused great concern, sadness, and suffering among 
them”). 
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21, the right to property.217  In one of the judgment’s operative 
paragraphs, where the Court summarizes its conclusions, it finds 
Ecuador responsible for “the violation of the rights to consultation, 
to indigenous communal property, and to cultural identity, in the 
terms of Article 21 of the American Convention.”218  Sarayaku even 
linked rights to life and personal integrity (Articles 4 and 5 of the 
Convention, respectively) to Article 21.219 
 A few years before, the Saramaka judgment offered another 
prominent example of this approach; its operative section stated 
violations of juridical personality (Article 3 of the Convention) and 
judicial protection (Article 25) “in relation to the right to property 
recognized in Article 21.”220  In fact, as indicated earlier, Saramaka 
connected Article 21 to the numerous rights associated with the 
community’s ability “to freely determine and enjoy [its] own social, 
cultural and economic development.”221  Thus, the Court regards 
Article 21 as a repository of essential indigenous rights, much as 
Anaya attributes such rights to the overarching principle of self-
determination.  The following Section will consider the 
implications of the Court’s unique use of the right to property. 
4. SHIFTING FROM PROPERTY RIGHTS TO VIDA DIGNA 
The Court’s line of cases on indigenous peoples, after twists 
and turns, at last has fully established the right to communal 
property under Article 21 of the Convention.  Of course, collective 
property itself has diverse forms, not all of them of a sacred and 
                                                     
217 See id. ¶ 146 (“[The] connection between territory and natural resources 
that indigenous and tribal peoples have traditionally maintained and that is 
necessary for their physical and cultural survival and the development and 
continuation of their worldview must be protected under Article 21 of the 
Convention to ensure that they can continue their traditional way of living, and 
that their distinctive cultural identity, social structure, economic system, customs, 
beliefs and traditions are respected, guaranteed and protected by States.”). 
218 Id. ¶ 341(2).   
219 Id. ¶ 341(3) (“The State is responsible for severely jeopardizing the rights 
to life and to personal integrity, recognized in Articles 4(1) and 5(1) of the 
American Convention, in relation to the obligation to guarantee the right to 
communal property, in the terms of Articles 1(1) and 21 thereof, to the detriment 
of the members of the Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku . . . .”). 
220 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Reparations, 
Merits, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 214(2) (Nov. 
28, 2007), interpreted by Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 185 (2008). 
221 Id. ¶ 95. 
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ancestral nature.222  However, it was clearly this vital connection 
between traditional territories and indigenous ways of life that 
inspired the recognition of communal land rights in the Inter-
American System. 
This case law has undoubtedly served indigenous interests to 
the extent that it reaffirms and protects their territories and 
resources under domestic law.  But the Court has become trapped 
in its own discourse on indigenous lands.  Whenever it has found a 
right to communal property, as a manner of justification, it has 
emphasized how the right is inextricably linked to other norms 
essential for indigenous peoples:  cultural identity, social welfare, 
political participation, juridical personality, etc.  It all started with 
Awas Tingni:  “the close ties of indigenous people with the land 
must be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their 
cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity.”223  The various norms 
are closely related, of course, but this does not mean that property 
should serve as a configurative principle for indigenous rights. 
Despite caution occasionally expressed along the years,224 the 
Court’s posture has solidified with Sarayaku.  Judgments now 
directly attest to Article 21 as a structural basis for indigenous 
rights.  The ramifications of the Tribunal’s property approach are 
unsettling. 
4.1.  Disadvantages of a Property Approach 
4.1.1. Overly-Narrow Concept that Limits Autonomy 
The Court’s narrow approach limits the autonomy of 
indigenous peoples and their capacity for change.225  Often, 
                                                     
222 E.g., WILLIAM STOEBUCK & DALE WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 225 (3d 
ed.  2000). 
223 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Cmty. v. Nicaragua, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79 ¶ 149 (Aug. 31, 2001) 
(emphasis added). 
224 See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 16 (Mar. 
29, 2006) (separate opinion of Judge García-Ramírez) (“The idea of putting the 
indigenous form of ownership . . . on the same footing as that of the civil law also 
preserved under Article 21 of the Convention may prove extremely 
disadvantageous to the legitimate interests and lawful rights of the indigenous 
people.”). 
225 See ENGLE, supra note 17, at 162-182; PRICE, supra note 158, at 238-39 
(finding “disturbingly essentialist” Saramaka’s requirement that natural resources 
must be “traditionally used” for Article 21 protections); Dulitzky, supra note 173, 
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indigenous peoples are expected to follow an uncompromising 
‘cultural script’ with numerous parts:  strict observer of customary 
practices, guardian of nature, and even steward of non-capitalist 
economies.226  But ‘traditional’ or environmentally-sound modes of 
subsistence and production may currently be inadequate to sustain 
communities.227  As a result, communities could choose to allow 
resource extraction and other development activities on their 
territories, or they may decide to sell ancestral land, partially or in 
full.228 
In doing so, the community risks endangering the many rights 
that the Court associates with its right to property.  The Court, 
state authorities, or others might consider that the community has 
forfeited these fundamental norms, including its very indigenous 
identity.229  A similar, and quite common, problem occurs with 
those indigenous populations who have left or been displaced 
from their ancestral lands, possibly many years ago.230  Thus, if the 
‘traditional’ connection is severed, or as Engle states, “when they 
do not behave toward the land in the idealized manner that has 
                                                     
at 42 (explaining that to obtain property protection, groups are pressured to show 
the Court an “essentialized and frozen culture”). 
226 See United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de 
Janerio, Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, ¶ 
22, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Annex I, (Aug. 12, 1992) 
(“Indigenous people and their communities and other local communities have a 
vital role in environmental management and development because of their 
knowledge and traditional practices.  States should recognize and duly support 
their identity, culture and interests and enable their effective participation in the 
achievement of sustainable development.”); ENGLE, supra note 17, at 169, 220 
(“Because of their apparent special relationship to the land, [indigenous peoples] 
are expected to be its protectors and guardians . . . indigenous peoples are 
situated to be the stewards, not only of the environment but also of non-capitalist 
economies.”); GILBERT, supra note 34, at 139; Falk, supra note 47, at 23 (“The 
Aboriginal viewpoint corresponds closely with the ecological perspective, and is 
at odds with developmental and growth perspectives of modern industrializing 
societies.”); KYMLICKA, supra note 26, at 250 (“[M]embers of indigenous 
communities are expected to ’act Indian’ []—that is, to follow ‘authentic’ cultural 
practices . . . .”); PRICE, supra note 158, at 238-39 (“For decades, anthropologists 
and historians have been criticizing such . . . Western ideas that essentialize 
‘culture’ (and ‘cultures’) and that put a prime on ‘tradition’ as the central diacritic 
of cultural authenticity.”). 
227 See ENGLE, supra note 17, at 196. 
228 See id. at 179–81 (acknowledging that such a decision could lead to 
negative consequences, including damage to identity, culture, and political and 
economic power). 
229 See id. at 168–70. 
230 See id.  
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come to be expected of them,” they may no longer be regarded as 
“real Indians.”231 
In sum, basing varied and essential rights on land requires that 
indigenous peoples have a particular, and often unrealistic, 
relationship to their territories.  Only a narrow category of 
contemporary indigenous peoples may have such a relationship.232  
Moreover, even for that limited category, the approach is 
inadequate.  For the numerous rights associated with land to 
remain intact, the peoples’ choices for development and market 
participation could be severely restricted.233 
4.1.2. Other Limitations of the Court’s Property Approach 
4.1.2.1. Text and Current Interpretations of Article 21 
The Court’s property approach is fundamentally flawed, 
including for those ‘idealized’ indigenous peoples who sustain 
themselves pursuing only ‘traditional’ relationships with ancestral 
lands—that is, those communities who do not wish to change 
significantly, or who lack options for change.234  The property 
approach is defective even if one relaxes the ‘cultural script’ and 
uses a definition of ‘traditional’ that can evolve over time, allowing 
for shifting realities or the adoption of modern technologies.235  
This is all because the right to property itself—a conditional 
precept, commonly infringed upon by states—is too weak to 
provide adequate protection for norms indispensable to 
indigenous peoples’ survival and development.  
                                                     
231 Id. at 170.  
232 See id. at 170, 181. 
233 See id. at 182 (“If they aim to participate in the market with regard to land, 
they go against their culture, potentially losing their claim to indigenousness.”); 
PRICE, supra note 158, at 238 (making a similar observation); Dulitzky, supra note 
173, at 42, 47, 78 (stating, inter alia, that limiting tribal and indigenous peoples to 
“traditional” modes of production and subsistence constrains their economic 
power). 
234 To the contrary, anthropologist Richard Price points out that “all societies 
change and develop through time.”  PRICE, supra note 158, at 239. 
235 For an example of this approach, see Länsman v. Finland, Views, U.N. 
Human Rights Committee, Commc’n No. 511/1992, ¶ 9.3, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992 (Oct. 26, 1994) (“Article 27 does not only protect 
traditional means of livelihood of national minorities . . . . Therefore, that the 
authors may have adapted their methods of reindeer herding over the years and 
practice it with the help of modern technology does not prevent them from 
invoking article 27 . . . .”). 
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The text of Article 21, as well as the Court’s interpretations of 
that language, illustrate the right’s many deficiencies.  Article 21(1) 
provides “Everyone has the right to the use and enjoyment of his 
property.  The law may subordinate such use and enjoyment to the 
interest of society.”236  Article 21(2) establishes that deprivation of 
property is only permissible “upon payment of just compensation, 
for reasons of public utility or social interest, and in the cases and 
according to the forms established by law.”237  These two 
provisions, read together, indicate that both property deprivations 
and interferences are fully permitted under a wide variety of 
circumstances. 
The Tribunal has avoided explaining the precise differences 
between deprivations and other kinds of interference to 
property.238  Consequently, a property owner is in peril that the 
Court will find a mere interference, leaving her without a right to 
compensation.  When deprivation is found, the Court holds “just 
compensation” must be “prompt, adequate and effective.”239  But 
the Inter-American criteria may not be as supportive of property 
owners as it first appears.  According to the recent judgment 
Salvador-Chiriboga v. Ecuador, for “adequate” compensation in 
expropriation matters, states must contemplate the property’s 
market value, as well as provide a “fair balance between the 
general interest and the [owner’s] interest.”240  The “fair balance” 
                                                     
236 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 117, at art. 21(1). 
237 Id. 
238 For example, in Chaparro-Álvarez v. Ecuador, the Court held that the failure 
to return seized company property “had an impact on [the company’s] value and 
productivity, which, in turn, prejudiced its shareholders.”  Chaparro-Álvarez v. 
Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 170, ¶ 209 (Nov. 21, 2007).  The Tribunal characterized 
these facts “as an arbitrary interference in the ‘enjoyment’ of the property under 
the provisions of Article 21(1).”  Id.  No further explanation was offered.  On the 
other hand, in the same judgment, the State’s failure to return an unlawfully-
seized private car constituted a “deprivation” pursuant to Article 21(2).  Id. ¶ 218. 
An apparent difference here is corporate versus private property, but the Tribunal 
did not clarify the difference. 
239 Salvador-Chiriboga v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objection and Merits, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 179, ¶ 96 (May 6, 2008).  This is a 
demanding standard known as the Hull formula, which since the 1930s has been 
contested by communist regimes and several developing countries.  Ursula 
Kriebaum & August Reinisch, Right to Property in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW ¶ 24 (2009) (noting the prompt, adequate, and 
effective compensation standard found in the Hull formula). 
240 Salvador-Chiriboga, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 98 (2008).  The Court added that 
interest should also be paid from the “date that the victim actually lost the right to 
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factor, which originates in European Court jurisprudence, adds to 
the calculus an element of arbitrariness.241 
Pursuant to Article 21(2), deprivation of property is only 
acceptable “in the cases and according to the forms established by 
law.”  However, Salvador-Chiriboga showed a malleable approach 
to this provision as well.  There, the Tribunal held that “it is not 
necessary that every cause for deprivation or restriction to the right 
to property be embodied in the law”; however, “it is essential that 
such law and its application respect the essential content of the 
right to property.”242  This pliable reading does not seem 
warranted by the Convention’s terms. 
Salvador-Chiriboga’s interpretations signal increasing deference 
to states.243  At this point in time, the Inter-American protections 
for property rights are possibly at their weakest.  These protections 
will only further erode if the Inter-American Tribunal continues to 
be influenced by the European Court.  Protocol 1 to the European 
Convention formulates a more constrained right than its analogue 
of the American Convention.244  The European Court, interpreting 
those terms, has permitted states wide latitude to infringe upon the 
right.245 
                                                     
enjoy possession of the property.”  Salvador-Chiriboga v. Ecuador, Reparations 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 222 ¶ 100 (Mar. 3, 2011). 
241 See Alejandra Gonza, El Artículo 21: Derecho a la Propiedad, in LA 
CONVENCIÓN AMERICANA COMENTADA (forthcoming 2013).  The “fair balance” test 
derives from the European Court’s case law and distinct circumstances.  See, e.g., 
DAVID HARRIS, MICHAEL O’BOYLE, COLIN WARBRICK, & CARLA BUCKLEY, HARRIS, 
O’BOYLE & WARBRICK: LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 680-
81 (2d ed. 2009) (describing the “fair balance” test).  Protocol 1 to the European 
Convention does not expressly provide for compensation, and the Strasbourg 
Tribunal accordingly grants much latitude to states with respect to their 
assessments of appropriate compensation and property value, if compensation is 
required at all.  Id.  In contrast, Article 21, although it was debated extensively, 
was eventually designed to guarantee ‘just compensation’ upon the deprivation of 
many forms of property.  Thus, the Inter-American Tribunal should exercise 
caution in applying European standards in this area.   
242 Salvador-Chiriboga, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 65 (2008). 
243 Even the European Court, which grants states much flexibility in this area, 
insists that property interferences be based on national law and that the 
legislation in question be “accessible, precise, and foreseeable.”  See e.g., 
Carbonara & Ventura v. Italy, 2000-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶64 (2000), available at 
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-58595. 
244 For more information on the drafting of Protocol 1, see 8 COLLECTED 
EDITION OF THE “TRAVAUX PRÉPARATOIRES” OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON 
HUMAN RIGHTS 126-140 (1985). 
245 See, e.g., James v. United Kingdom, 98 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1986) 
(recognizing that states have significant leeway to interfere with property rights); 
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4.1.2.2. The “Safeguards” of Saramaka People v. Suriname 
Fundamental indigenous rights, then, have been placed within 
one of the most compromised Articles of the American 
Convention.  The Saramaka judgment, nevertheless, tried to 
mitigate damage by adding protections for traditional lands.  
Under Article 21, as noted above, Suriname was required to 
implement three safeguards in conjunction with development 
projects:  “effective participation” of the community, reasonable 
benefits, and an impact assessment.246  However, not only are the 
safeguards too easily evaded by states, they have already started to 
deteriorate with Sarayaku v. Ecuador. 
The Court has taken pains to explain its concept of “effective 
participation.”247  It has held that states have “a duty to actively 
consult” with the indigenous community, which requires “good-
faith” efforts starting at the “early stages” of the development 
plan.248  The consultations “should take account” of “traditional 
methods of decision-making.”  For example, it is the indigenous 
                                                     
HARRIS, O’BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 241, at 694–695 (noting the European 
Court’s extensive deference to the decisions of national bodies).   
246 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 129 (Nov. 
28, 2007), interpreted by Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 185 (2008). 
247 Id. ¶133.  
248 Id.  In its 2008 judgment interpreting the Saramaka decision, the Court 
clarified that the original judgment had required the State to consult with the 
Saramaka people: 
regarding at least the following six issues:  (1) the process of delimiting, 
demarcating and granting collective title over the territory of the 
Saramaka people; (2) the process of granting the members of the 
Saramaka people legal recognition of their collective juridical capacity, 
pertaining to the community to which they belong; (3) the process of 
adopting legislative, administrative, and other measures as may be 
required to recognize, protect, guarantee, and give legal effect to the 
right of the members of the Saramaka people to the territory they have 
traditionally used and occupied; (4) the process of adopting legislative, 
administrative and other measures necessary to recognize and ensure the 
right of the Saramaka people to be effectively consulted, in accordance 
with their traditions and customs; (5) regarding the results of prior 
environmental and social impact assessments, and (6) regarding any 
proposed restrictions of the Saramaka people’s property rights, 
particularly regarding proposed development or investment plans in or 
affecting Saramaka territory.   
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 185, ¶ 16 (Aug. 12, 2008). 
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community, not the state, who must decide which person or 
persons will represent the community in the process.249  
Consultations are also the state’s responsibility and cannot be 
delegated to corporations.250 
Though the consultations must have “the objective of reaching 
an agreement,” Saramaka only required states to obtain actual 
consent in certain circumstances.251  With regard to “large-scale 
development or investment projects that would have a major 
impact” within indigenous territory, states have “a duty not only 
to consult” with the affected community, “but also to obtain [its] 
free, prior, and informed consent, according to [its] customs and 
traditions.”252  The Court alternately described such projects as 
“major development or investment plans that may have a 
profound impact on the property rights of [the community] to a 
large part of their territory.”253  Saramaka’s standard on consent, 
while still deferential to states, was at the vanguard of 
international law.  The UNDRIP established consent as the 
“objective” of consultations, but only expressly required it in a 
couple of drastic scenarios:  when the project will result in a 
community’s “relocation” from its traditional lands, and in 
situations involving the storage or disposal of toxic waste within 
territories.254  
Impact assessments, according to the Tribunal, “must conform 
to the relevant international standards and best practices,” such as 
                                                     
249 Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 133 (2007). 
250 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and 
Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 187 (June 27, 2012). 
Still, this standard should be articulated more clearly by the Court.  
251 Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 133 (2007). 
252 Id. ¶ 134.  
253 Id. ¶ 137.  The Court offered a third formulation in its interpretation of the 
judgment:  “when large-scale development or investment projects could affect the 
integrity of the Saramaka people’s lands and natural resources.”  Saramaka, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 17 (2008). 
254 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, art. 10, 
29(2) U.N. Doc. A/61/L.67 (Sept. 13, 2007).  See also Special Rapporteur on the 
Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous People, 
Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, Civil, Political, Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Including the Right to Development, Human Rights Council, ¶ 47, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/34 (July 15, 2009) (by James Anaya) [hereinafter Promotion 
and Protection of all Human Rights] (“[T]he Declaration recognizes two situations in 
which the State is under an obligation to obtain the consent of the indigenous 
peoples concerned, beyond the general obligation to have consent as the objective 
of consultations.”). 
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the Akwé:  Kon Guidelines for the Conduct of Cultural, 
Environmental and Social Impact Assessments.255  They must 
respect the traditions and culture of indigenous communities, and 
be concluded “prior to the granting” of state concessions.256  If 
subcontracted, the studies should still be supervised by state 
authorities.257  In addition, the assessments should always consider 
accumulated impacts from past, current, and proposed projects.258 
While these two safeguards—”effective participation” and 
impact assessments—have been developed in some detail, there is 
still uncertainty about when they should be applied.  At the outset, 
Saramaka required effective participation “regarding any 
development, investment, exploration or extraction plan . . . within 
Saramaka territory.”259  But later the Court implied that non-
”traditional” resources, when not affecting “vital” community 
resources, could possibly be extracted freely by states.260  This 
ambiguity may encourage governments to procure assessments 
denying the “traditional” character of certain resources, in order to 
initiate projects without even consulting indigenous 
communities.261  Yet the nature and importance of the resources 
could only be determined by fully consulting the communities.  
And potential consequences of projects could only be assessed by 
examining a thorough impact analysis. 
In this way, when states plan to initiate projects on ancestral 
lands, it is difficult to imagine how consultation and impact 
                                                     
255 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and 
Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 206 (June 27, 2012); 
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Interpretation of the Judgment on Preliminary 
Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 185, ¶ 41 n.23 (Aug. 12, 2008). 
256 Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 41 (2008). 
257 Id. 
258 Id. 
259 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 129 (Nov. 
28, 2007), interpreted by Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 185 (2008). 
260 Id. ¶ 155 (stating that the safeguards should apply to “other concessions 
within Saramaka territory involving natural resources which have not been 
traditionally used by members of the Saramaka community, but that their 
extraction will necessarily affect other resources that are vital to their way of life”) 
(emphasis added). 
261 Contra Saramaka, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 16 (2008) (creating a potentially 
more demanding standard requiring consultation “regarding any proposed 
restrictions of the Saramaka people’s property rights, particularly regarding 
proposed development or investment plans in or affecting Saramaka territory”).  
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assessments could ever justifiably be omitted.  Yet the Court has 
left the door open.  Also surprisingly, the Court has not 
emphasized the significance of a prompt impact assessment.  An 
assessment clearly must be finished as soon as possible, in order to 
fully inform the indigenous community’s intervention.  Otherwise, 
its decisions could be based upon incorrect or incomplete 
information.  But the Tribunal’s language requires the completion 
of the impact assessment merely at some point before the state’s 
issuance of a concession.262 
Another major uncertainty involves when ‘good-faith’ and 
‘active’ consultations harden into a requirement for ‘free, prior, 
and informed consent’ (“FPIC”).  This controversial matter is 
particularly doubtful after Sarayaku.  The judgment, despite 
Saramaka’s precedent and the petitioners’ demands for consent 
standards,263 ignored the principle completely.  Clearly, there is 
powerful state and corporate opposition to an indigenous ‘veto 
power.’264  Nevertheless, both indigenous leaders and a variety of 
other actors around the globe increasingly support FPIC.265  
                                                     
262 See id. ¶ 41 (“[Environmental and Social Impact Studies] must be 
completed prior to the granting of the concession . . . .”); Kichwa Indigenous 
People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 206 (June 27, 2012) (“[E]nvironmental impact assessments 
must be . . . completed before the concession is granted . . . .”).    
263 See Sarayaku, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. ¶ 127 (noting the petitioners’ argument 
that Ecuador “incurred international responsibility for violating Articles 21, 13 
and 23 of the Convention” because Ecuador did not obtain prior consent for its oil 
venture).  
264 See, e.g., Promotion and Protection of all Human Rights, supra note 254, ¶ 48. 
265 See, e.g., Rep. of the Int’l. Expert Grp. Meeting on Extractive Indus., 
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and Corporate Social Responsibility, Permanent 
Forum on Indigenous Issues, May 18–29, 2009, 8th Sess. ¶ 84, U.N. Doc. 
E/C.19/2009/CRP.8 (May 4, 2009) (recommending that states “[e]nsure that the 
legislation governing the granting of concessions includes provisions on 
consultation and FPIC, in line with international standards and which recognize 
the right of Indigenous Peoples to say no . . . ”); Rep. of the Office of the U.N. 
High Comm’r for Human Rights, International Workshop on Natural Resource 
Companies, Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights: Setting A Framework for 
Consultation, Benefit-Sharing and Dispute Resolution, Human Rights Council, Dec. 3, 
2008–Dec. 4, 2008, ¶ 15, A/HRC/EMRIP/2009/5 (July 3, 2009) (“Efforts should be 
made to respect the principles of good faith and of free, prior and informed 
consent of indigenous peoples.”); MARIANNE VOSS & EMILY GREENSPAN, OXFAM 
AMERICA RESEARCH BACKGROUND SERIES, COMMUNITY CONSENT INDEX: OIL, GAS AND 
MINING COMPANY PUBLIC POSITIONS ON FREE, PRIOR, AND INFORMED CONSENT (FPIC) 
1, 12–16 (2012), available at http://www.oxfamamerica.org/files/community-
consent-index.pdf (arguing that indigenous peoples have an international “right 
to free, prior, and informed” consent); but see Promotion and Protection of all Human 
Rights, supra note 254, ¶ 65 (suggesting that the current UN Special Rapporteur 
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Recently, the UN Human Rights Committee266 and the African 
Commission set out standards in strong support of the 
requirement.267  Even international finance institutions and 
industry associations have adopted FPIC.268 
                                                     
takes a more moderate approach:  “indigenous consent is presumptively a 
requirement for those aspects of any extractive operation that takes place within 
the officially recognized or customary land use areas of indigenous peoples, or 
that has a direct bearing on areas of cultural significance, in particular sacred 
places, or on natural resources that are traditionally used by indigenous peoples 
in ways that are important to their survival”). 
266 See Poma Poma v. Peru, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Commc’n No. 
1457/2006, ¶ 7.6, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/95/D/1457/2006 (Apr. 24, 2009).  This case 
holds: 
the admissibility of measures which substantially compromise or 
interfere with the culturally significant economic activities of a minority 
or indigenous community depends on whether the members of the 
community in question have had the opportunity to participate in the 
decision-making process in relation to these measures and whether they 
will continue to benefit from their traditional economy. The Committee 
considers that participation in the decision-making process must be 
effective, which requires not mere consultation but the free, prior and 
informed consent of the members of the community. 
Id. 
267 See African Comm’n on Human and Peoples’ Rights [ACHPR], Resolution 
on a Human Rights-Based Approach to Natural Resources Governance, 51st Sess., Apr. 
18-May 2, 2012, available at http://www.achpr.org/sessions/51st/resolutions/224 
(“[A]ll necessary measures must be taken by the State to ensure participation, 
including the free, prior and informed consent of communities, in decision 
making related to natural resources governance.”); Ctr. for Minority Rights Dev. 
(Kenya) v. Kenya, Afr. Comm’n on Human & Peoples’ Rights, Comm. No. 
276/2003, ¶ 291  (Feb. 4, 2010) (holding that, with respect to “any development or 
investment projects that would have a major impact within the Endorois territory, 
the State has a duty not only to consult with the community, but also to obtain 
their free, prior, and informed consent, according to their customs and 
traditions”). 
268 See, e.g., INT’L. FIN. CORP., PROGRESS REPORT ON IFC’S POLICY AND 
PERFORMANCE STANDARDS ON SOC. AND ENVTL. SUSTAINABILITY, AND ACCESS TO INFO. 
POLICY ¶ 58 (2010), available at www1.ifc.org (noting that banks such as the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Inter-American 
Development Bank, Asian Development Bank, International Fund for Agricultural 
Development, as well as industry associations, such as Hydropower Association, 
have adopted or are planning to adopt FPIC principles); Fergus MacKay, 
Indigenous Peoples and International Financial Institutions, in INTERNATIONAL 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 312 (Daniel D. Bradlow and 
David B. Hunter eds., 2010) (indicating that some “major donation institutions 
such as the UNDP, IFAD, the European Commission” and others require FPIC); 
VOSS & GREENSPAN, supra note 265, at 13–14 (“[D]iscussion of the FPIC principle 
among international institutions has moved beyond questions of whether it 
should be implemented to discussions of how it should be implemented.”); 
Position Statement: Mining and Indigenous Peoples, INT’L COUNCIL ON MINING & 
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The Court’s ‘right to consultation’ is not enough.  Even if it 
were a “general principle of international law,” the concept rapidly 
dissolves into empty rhetoric.269  There are too many opportunities 
for exploitation, despite the Court’s efforts to establish specific 
guidelines.  In fact, all three safeguards are limited.  A state might 
conduct ‘active’ consultations, commission an impact study, and 
even provide the affected community ‘reasonable benefits.’  It 
could then largely ignore the information gathered and inflict 
significant damage on ancestral lands and resources, all the while 
complying with the Court’s requirements.  Furthermore, even the 
Saramaka consent standard, “large-scale development or 
investment projects that would have a major impact,” offers 
inadequate protection for indigenous peoples.270  A small-scale 
operation that destroys a sacred site would have devastating 
consequences for a community, yet it would not require consent by 
the Court.271 
Thus, rather than address these deficiencies, Sarayaku mostly 
decreased protections.  The judgment left out the key condition of 
prior, informed consent.  ‘Reasonable benefits’ from projects were 
also ignored, under the pretense that they lacked relevance to the 
case.  It is true that Sarayaku expanded the right to consultation to 
include matters beyond lands and resources.  At the same time, if it 
curtailed the right to consent, this restriction would seriously 
impact all indigenous rights.  Furthermore, casting doubt on 
‘reasonable benefits’ from resource extraction projects would, at 
                                                     
METALS, May 2008, at 1, available at http://www.icmm.com/document/293 
(stating that indigenous peoples have the right to be informed and heard 
regarding projects that may adversely affect their interests).  
269 See Farith Simon, Obligación democrática, EL COMERCIO, Oct. 29, 2012, 
http://www.elcomercio.com/farith_simon/Obligacion-
democratica_0_800320071.html (arguing that because the Inter-American Court 
preferred consultation rights over consent rights, Ecuador effectively won the 
Sarayaku case). 
270 See Pasqualucci, International Indigenous Land Rights, supra note 121, at 98 
(“[The standard] seems to give states leeway to grant smaller for-profit logging 
and mining concessions that could still negatively impact indigenous 
communities.”).  
271 See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) 
(providing a real example of such a scenario).  In Lyng, the U.S. government 
sought to build a short road through sacred sites of Native Americans.  Justice 
Brennan, in a blistering dissent, wrote:  “I find it difficult, however, to imagine 
conduct more insensitive to religious needs than the Government’s determination 
to build a marginally useful road in the face of uncontradicted evidence that the 
road will render the practice of respondents’ religion impossible.”  Id. at 477.   
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minimum, severely constrain the social welfare and development 
of indigenous peoples. 
In this way, the safeguards, never strong enough, are now in 
decline.  Rather than meaningfully restricting development 
options, they still provide states many opportunities to pursue 
lucrative projects.  It must be emphasized, however, that isolated 
attempts to fortify the safeguards will likely not solve the 
fundamental problem.  Stronger protections, under Article 21, will 
yield little fruit when a state ignores them it will ultimately amount 
to a simple property infringement—a small price to pay for a literal 
gold mine.272  In fact, under a property paradigm, a violation may 
not be found at all, especially if states begin to defend themselves 
vigorously before the Court.  The Court, like numerous tribunals, 
will presume that many state land actions are permissible.273  This 
presumption readily manifests itself in the Court’s minimalist 
language, despite its three safeguards.  Recall Saramaka, the very 
source of these three protections:  only those lands and resources 
“essential for the survival of their way of life” are protected by 
Article 21.274 
4.1.3. Conclusion 
As a former Court President remarked, placing indigenous 
land rights “on the same footing” as private property rights “may 
prove extremely disadvantageous to the legitimate interests and 
lawful rights of the indigenous people.”275  If Article 21, by itself, 
cannot adequately protect traditional lands, it certainly cannot 
                                                     
272 Although note that, currently, indigenous communal property violations 
still can lead to significant reparations orders from the Inter-American Court.  See 
infra Part IV: Shifting from Property Rights to Vida Digna. 
273 See, e.g., HARRIS, O’BOYLE & WARBRICK, supra note 241, at 694–95 
(describing European Court’s significant deference to states on property matters); 
Lynda J. Oswald, The Role of Deference in Judicial Review of Public Use 
Determinations, 39 B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 243, 245 (2012) (noting “the traditional 
deference given by [U.S.] courts to legislative determinations of the need to take 
property by eminent domain”); Shelton, Self-Determination, supra note 4, at 77 
(“[G]overnments routinely claim that a public interest in economic development 
overrides indigenous property rights.”). 
274 Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 123 (Nov. 
28, 2007), interpreted by Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 185 (2008) (emphasis 
added).  
275 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶16 (Mar. 29, 2006) (separate 
opinion of Judge García-Ramírez). 
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serve as the overarching principle for indigenous rights.  In these 
circumstances, the right to property is a constituent right that must 
be anchored to a stronger, deeper configurative principle to protect 
indigenous peoples’ way of life. 
The challenge, then, is to find this superior principle in the 
American Convention and the Court’s case law.  As discussed, 
Anaya generally has employed self-determination as an 
overarching structure for indigenous rights.  Yet neither the 
Convention nor the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties 
of Man276 establishes a right to self-determination.277  Further, the 
rare reference to the concept, in the Saramaka decision, was later 
spurned by Sarayaku.  Even the Draft American Declaration on the 
Rights of Indigenous Peoples, currently under negotiation, has left 
the language on self-determination in brackets.278 
4.2.  Alternative Frameworks for Indigenous Rights 
The Court has had a number of opportunities to develop 
alternative conceptions for its indigenous rights framework.  To 
illustrate, in Sarayaku, the Inter-American Commission and the 
petitioners alleged, among others, violations of Articles 13 
(Freedom of Expression), 23 (Political Rights), and 26 (Social, 
Economic and Cultural Rights) of the American Convention.279  
                                                     
276 See Organization of American States, American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man, May 2, 1948, OEA/Ser.L.V/II.92, doc. 31 rev. 3 (serving as a non-
binding legal instrument of the Organization of American States). 
277 Three decades ago, the Inter-American Commission acknowledged that 
international law recognizes a right to self-determination, but the Commission 
denied its applicability to the Miskito of Nicaragua, explaining that “this does not 
mean . . . that it recognizes the right to self-determination of any ethnic group as 
such.”  Organization of American States, Rep. on the Situation of Human Rights 
of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., at Part II, B(9), OEA/Ser.L./V.II.62, doc. 10 rev. 3 (Nov. 29, 1983). 
278 See Organization of American States, Record of the Current Status of the 
Draft American Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Twelfth Meeting of 
Negotiations in the Quest for Points of Consensus, Nov. 30–Dec. 2, 2009, Draft 
Article 3, OEA/Ser.K/XVI/GT/DADIN/doc.334/08 rev. 5 (Dec. 3, 2009).    
Interestingly, the right to self-determination is found in the Preamble to the 
Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, “Protocol of San Salvador.”  Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights (“Protocol of San Salvador”), pmbl., OAS Treaty Series, 
no. 69, 28 I.L.M. 156 (Nov. 16, 1999). 
279 Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and 
Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶¶ 126–27, 137 (June 
27, 2012). 
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They argued for breaches of Articles 13 and 23 because the 
community was not appropriately consulted, and it was deprived 
of key information about the resource extraction projects.  The 
Tribunal curtly responded that “the facts have been sufficiently 
analyzed and the violations conceptualized under the rights to 
communal property, consultation and cultural identity . . . in the 
terms of Article 21.”280 
As for employing cultural rights as a framework, the Court has 
made specific reference to these rights in assorted indigenous cases 
(see Part III, supra).281  Generally, according to Engle, cultural rights 
“have provided the dominant framework for indigenous rights 
advocacy since at least the 1990s.”282  As considered earlier, bodies 
such as the UN Human Rights Committee have preferred claims of 
cultural integrity over those of self-determination.  Yet Engle 
cautions that cultural rights frameworks, similar to property rights 
approaches, have often proven deleterious:  they threaten “to limit 
the groups that might qualify for protection, force groups to 
overstate their cultural cohesion, and limit indigenous economic, 
political and territorial autonomy.”283 
Despite these dangers, one still may be surprised that Article 
26—the Convention’s primary social and cultural rights 
provision284—has not been discussed more often by the Court in its 
judgments on indigenous communities.  Article 26 states as 
follows: 
[t]he States Parties undertake to adopt measures . . . with a 
view to achieving progressively, by legislation or other 
appropriate means, the full realization of the rights implicit 
in the economic, social, educational, scientific, and cultural 
                                                     
280 Id. ¶ 230. 
281 See also Marco Odello, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and Cultural Identity in the 
Inter-American Context, 16 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. 25, 34–41 (2012) (discussing the Inter-
American case law on cultural rights and cultural identity). 
282 ENGLE, supra note 17, at 1.  
283 Id. at 13. 
284 American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 117, at art. 26.  Other 
provisions of the American Convention have social, economic and/or cultural 
dimensions.  For example, Article 19 provides “Every minor child has the right to 
the measures of protection required by his condition as a minor on the part of his 
family, society, and the state.”  Id. at art. 19.  Article 17, for its part, provides for 
the “Rights of the Family.”  Id. at art. 17. 
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standards set forth in the Charter of the Organization of 
American States . . . .285 
However, the Court has viewed the ‘progressive development’ 
standard as a major constraint.  It has directly considered Article 26 
in only two judgments and has never found a violation of the 
provision.286  In Sarayaku, the Tribunal rejected the arguments for 
an Article 26 violation without discussion.  Though it appears to 
regard Article 26 as justiciable,287 the Court’s restrictive approach 
has stalled the development of the provision and the elaboration of 
its constituent rights. 
4.3.  Vida Digna as a Structural Basis for Indigenous Rights 
4.3.1. Introduction to the Court’s Vida Digna Concept 
The Court’s vida digna doctrine, often translated as ‘the right to 
a dignified life’ or ‘the right to a dignified existence,’ is primarily 
grounded in the American Convention’s Article 4 (Right to Life).  
The Tribunal introduced the concept in 1999, with the seminal 
judgment Villagrán-Morales et al. v. Guatemala, and has further 
developed the principle in subsequent decisions.288  For both 
                                                     
285 Id. at art. 26.  
286 The Inter-American Court examined Article 26 in only two judgments: 
Five Pensioners v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 98 (Feb. 28, 2003); Acevedo-Buendía v. Peru, Preliminary 
Objection, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 198 (July 1, 2009).  In Sarayaku, it simply held that it was “not appropriate” to 
consider an Article 26 violation.  Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayuku v. 
Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶ 
341(5) (June 27, 2012). 
287 The Tribunal stated that “the progressive implementation of said 
measures may be subjected to accountability and, if applicable, compliance . . . 
may be demanded before instances called to decide on possible human rights 
violations”; furthermore, it held that a state’s regression in the protection of social, 
economic and cultural rights is “actionable” under Article 26.  Acevedo-Buendía 
v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 198, ¶¶ 102-103 (July 1, 2009).  Also, Judge 
García-Ramírez, in his Concurring Opinion, stated that the Court had affirmed the 
justiciability of Article 26.  Id. ¶¶ 15-21 (concurring opinion of Judge García-
Ramírez).  
288 See generally Steven R. Keener & Javier Vasquez, A Life Worth Living: 
Enforcement of the Right to Health through the Right to Life in the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 595 (2009); Jo M. Pasqualucci, The 
Right to a Dignified Life (Vida Digna): The Integration of Economic and Social Rights 
with Civil and Political Rights in the Inter-American Human Rights System, 31 
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2008) [hereinafter Pasqualucci, Right to a 
Dignified Life]. 
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practical and conceptual reasons, vida digna offers a promising 
structural basis for indigenous rights. 
Villagrán-Morales involved the shocking murder of five street 
children at the hands of the Guatemalan national police.  The Court 
asserted that states should seek to provide “at-risk children” with 
the “minimum conditions for a dignified life,” promoting the “full 
and harmonious development of their personality.”289  Five years 
later, Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay held that states have 
the duty to ensure that incarcerated persons (both adults and 
children) can still enjoy a vida digna.290  Detention conditions must 
allow for “opportunities for exercise or recreation,” education, and 
“prompt and proper medical, dental and psychological care.”291 
In Yakye-Axa, as described above, an indigenous community 
was denied entrance to its traditional territories for farming, 
hunting, and fishing.  Health conditions and temporary housing 
were miserable.  The Court condemned this infringement upon 
their vida digna: 
Special detriment to the right to health, and closely tied to 
this, detriment to the right to food and access to clean 
water, have a major impact on the right to a decent 
existence and basic conditions to exercise other human 
                                                     
289 Villagrán-Morales v. Guatemala, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 63, ¶ 191 (Nov. 19, 1999). 
290 Juvenile Reeducation Institute v. Paraguay, Preliminary Objections, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 112, ¶ 
176 (Sept. 2, 2004). 
291 Id. ¶¶ 164-166.  Because the conditions were seriously deficient in Juvenile 
Reeducation Institute, the Court found Paraguay in breach of both Articles 4 and 5 
(Right to Humane Treatment) with respect to all inmates—over three thousand 
children and young adults.  While many of the detained were adolescents, the 
“decent living conditions” described are required for all incarcerated individuals.  
For example, the Tribunal stated “the Court must establish whether the State, in 
fulfillment of its role of guarantor, took measures to ensure to all inmates at the 
Center—adults and children alike—the right to live with dignity and thus help 
them build their life plan, even while incarcerated.”  Id. ¶ 164.  The Court requires 
additional protections for detained children.  Id. ¶ 176.  Similarly, the Human 
Rights Committee has employed the ICCPR’s right to life provision to demand 
proper medical treatment and sanitary conditions for detainees.  Lantsova v. 
Russian Fed’n, U.N. Human Rights Committee, Commc’n No. 763/1997,  U.N. 
Doc. CCPR/C/74/D/763/1997 (Mar. 26, 2002).  See also Martin Scheinin, Human 
Rights Committee: Not Only a Committee on Civil and Political Rights, in SOCIAL 
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE  
LAW 540, 548 (Malcolm Langford ed., 2008). 
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rights, such as the right to education or the right to cultural 
identity.292 
Because the State had not taken sufficient “measures regarding the 
conditions that affected their possibility of having a decent life,” 
the Court held that Article 4 was abridged.293  The Court made a 
similar pronouncement with respect to the community in Xákmok 
Kásek.294 
In this way, the Inter-American Court has recognized the rights 
to health, education, food, and clean water under the framework of 
vida digna and protected by Article 4, and, occasionally, Article 5 
(Right to Humane Treatment).  The Court has also directly applied 
the doctrine to indigenous peoples; in one instance, cited above in 
Yakye Axa, cultural identity was even linked to vida digna.  Thus, 
the Court regards vida digna as a means to protect a range of 
rights—including those of a social, economic, and cultural nature—
under the right to life. 
4.3.2. Brief Context for Vida Digna 
Human dignity has served as the central basis for the 
international human rights movement, laying the foundation for 
the American and Universal Declarations of Human Rights, as well 
as the diverse instruments that followed.295  Variations on the 
                                                     
292 Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 167 (June 17, 2005). 
293 Id. ¶ 176.  The Human Rights Committee has comparably remarked that 
homelessness and health problems engage states’ duties to ensure the right to life. 
U.N. Human Rights Comm., Concluding Observations of the Human Rights 
Committee, Canada, U.N. Doc CCPR/C/79/Add. 105 (Apr. 7 1999); U.N. Human 
Rights Comm., General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to Life), ¶ 5 (Apr. 30, 1982) 
in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), 176-78 (May 
27, 2008) [hereinafter General Comment No. 6].  For its part, the European Court of 
Human Rights found degrading treatment, a violation to Article 3 of the 
European Convention, when it observed that dire living conditions had a 
“detrimental effect on the applicants’ health and well-being.”  Moldovan v. 
Romania (No. 2), 2005-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 110.  The case originated in an attack 
upon a Roma community; the community was forced from its homes and lived in 
a destitute state for ten years.  Id. ¶¶ 18-19.   
294 Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 217 (Aug. 24, 2010). 
295 For example, see Organization of American States, American Declaration 
of the Rights and Duties of Man, O.A.S. G.A. Res. XXX, Preamble & art. XXIII, 
O.A.S. Doc. OEA/Ser.L.V./II.82 doc.6 rev.1 (1948), which states: 
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concept reach far back in history; the Roman philosopher Cicero 
prominently advocated that human beings have special worth 
simply by virtue of being human.296 
Christopher McCrudden writes that religious, philosophical 
and historical “strategies” have been employed to explain the basis 
for human dignity.297  The enduring concept, championed by 
figures as diverse as Grotius, Kant, and Bolivar, has played a key 
role in influential social movements and political writings.298  The 
Catholic Church holds that “the dignity of the human person” 
owes to humanity’s creation in the image of God.299 
Yet with so many ways to define and explain human dignity, 
some of them conflicting, there is concern that the concept serves 
as a mere placeholder.300   Of course, the term’s versatility and 
general appeal provided a much-needed basis for the foundational 
                                                     
All men are born free and equal, in dignity and in rights, and, being 
endowed by nature with reason and conscience, they should conduct 
themselves as brothers one to another . . . Every person has a right to 
own such private property as meets the essential needs of decent living 
and helps to maintain the dignity of the individual and of the home. 
Id.  See also, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res 217 (III) A, U.N. 
Doc A/RES/217(III), at 72 (Dec. 10, 1948) (stating “[w]hereas the peoples of the 
United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human 
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of 
men and women and have determined to promote social progress and better 
standards of life in larger freedom”). 
296 Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of 
Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 655, 657 (2008). 
297 Id. at 658. 
298 Id. at 658-61. 
299 ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH pt. 3, § 1, 
ch. 1, art. 1 (1994). available at http://www.vatican.va/archive/ccc_css/archive/ 
catechism/p3s1c1a1.htm. 
300 See McCrudden, supra note 296, at 698 (“All that is left of dignity, it might 
be said, is the relatively empty shell provided by the minimum core”).  But see 
Paolo G. Carozza, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of Human Rights: A 
Reply, 19 EUR. J. INT’L L. 931, 935 (2008) in which Carozza disputes this 
characterization and argues:  
this status and basic principle of human dignity are not merely fatuous 
or insignificant. Even stated at very high levels of generality and 
incompleteness, they have served to catalyse political action for human 
rights and their recognition in positive law.  They are widely accepted 
and employed by judges in interpreting that law.  And they are 
sufficiently robust in substance to challenge and undermine the 
legitimacy of a wide array of political and economic systems which at 
different times have wielded power in ways systematically contrary to 
the good of human persons. 
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human rights texts.  On the Universal Declaration, McCrudden 
remarks that “[e]veryone could agree that human dignity was 
central, but not why or how”—so they simply inserted their own 
theory.301  Because of this adaptability, the concept is open to 
judicial discretion, allowing for the extension of existing rights and 
the creation of new ones.302 
Dignity’s flexibility has its pitfalls,303 but it also provides 
significant opportunities for indigenous peoples in the Inter-
American context.  It furnishes a multidimensional principle that 
carries significant weight for the Inter-American Court.  The 
Court’s judges, most often of Latin American origin, are well 
acquainted with concepts of dignity—and not just because of 
international human rights texts and Bolivar’s stance against 
slavery.  Catholic and social democratic influences were powerful 
in Central and South America, cementing human dignity in the 
constitutions of the Americas.304  The Inter-American Court counts 
as only one of many international and national tribunals receptive 
to human dignity arguments, and it is certainly not the first to link 
dignity to the right to life.305 
4.3.3. Application of the Vida Digna Framework 
In his separate opinions for Yakye-Axa and Sawhoyamaxa, Judge 
Cançado-Trindade suggested a couple of elements for my 
                                                     
301 McCrudden, supra note 296, at 678. 
302 Id. at 721. 
303 In general, Kingsbury urges caution with flexible approaches to 
indigenous advocacy that are “far from the absolutism of rights” and permit 
“evasion and abuse.”  Kingsbury, supra note 39, at 249. 
304 McCrudden, supra note 296, at 664. 
305 See generally ERIN DALY, DIGNITY RIGHTS: COURTS, CONSTITUTIONS, AND THE 
WORTH OF THE HUMAN PERSON (2013) (discussing how courts around the world 
interpret dignity).  According to the European Court of Human Rights, “the very 
essence of [the European Convention system], as the Court has often stated, is 
respect for human dignity (see, inter alia, Pretty v. the United Kingdom, . . . and V.C. 
v. Slovakia).”  Case of Vinter v.  United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 113 (2013).  The 
Indian Supreme Court interpreted the Constitutional guarantee of life and 
personal liberty to contain “the right to live with human dignity and all that goes 
along with it . . . such as adequate nutrition, clothing and shelter over the head 
and facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely 
moving about and mixing and commingling with fellow human beings.”  
McCrudden, supra note 296, at 693 (citing Mullin v. The Administrator, Union 
Territory of Delhi, AIR 1981 SCR (2) 516, at 518 (1981)).  This connection also often 
appears in political discourse; for example, Nelson Mandela has declared the 
“right to dignity and a decent life” to be “fundamental human rights.”  Id. at 663. 
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proposed framework.  In Yakye-Axa, writing with Judge Ventura-
Robles, he stated that the indigenous right to property “is directly 
related to full enjoyment of the right to life including conditions for 
a decent life [vida digna].”306  In Sawhoyamaxa, Judge Cançado-
Trindade posited that “[c]ultural identity is a component of, or an 
addition to, the fundamental right to life in its wider sense.”307  
Combining and further developing these ideas could lead to a 
more protective and cogent framework for indigenous rights.  A 
broad right-to-life concept could serve as the Court’s configurative 
principle, a structural basis for indigenous rights to property, 
cultural identity, and many others.  Consonant with the cases 
discussed above, the right to life in its wider sense is represented 
by the Court’s vida digna. 
Owing to the unique characteristics of indigenous peoples, one 
would expect that their requirements for a ‘dignified life’ would 
vary from other sectors of the general population.  Here, the five 
core elements of Anaya’s framework could serve as the 
parameters:  nondiscrimination, cultural integrity, lands and 
resources, social welfare and development, and self-government.  
Whenever such norms are breached with respect to an indigenous 
community, I propose that a violation of Article 4 should result. 
To illustrate, consider unauthorized resource extraction upon 
ancestral territories.  At a minimum, the communal right to 
property would be violated along with the right to vida digna.  In 
the Court’s language, Article 21 would be breached in conjunction 
with Article 4.  Despite the numerous drawbacks of Article 21, a 
violation to communal property still must be recognized.  This 
recognition would compel the state to undertake restitution, titling, 
and/or other necessary procedures under domestic property law.  
However, states would need to respect the traditional lands at a 
higher level—an Article 4 (Right to Life) standard rather than an 
Article 21 (Right to Property) standard. 
Similarly, in the indigenous context, violations of self-
government or equality principles would lead to breaches of 
appropriate Convention provisions—such as Article 23 (Right to 
                                                     
306 Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 20 (June 17, 2005) (dissenting 
opinion of Judges Cançado-Trindade and Ventura-Robles).  
307 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 28 (Mar. 29, 2006) (separate 
opinion of Judge Cançado-Trindade).  
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Participate in Government) and Article 24 (Right to Equal 
Protection), respectively—in conjunction with Article 4.  To 
reiterate, traditional lands and resources need not be involved in a 
case for the vida digna framework to apply.  For a norm such as 
cultural integrity, which the Court has established, but is not found 
in the Convention, Article 4 would be violated by itself.308   Overall, 
this approach seeks to increase the level of protection for each 
constitutive right of vida digna.  Thus, where indigenous peoples 
are concerned, these component rights (e.g., political rights, land 
rights) would be more demanding than when applied to other 
individuals. 
This approach is not unlike the ICCPR regime, which 
differentiates the rights provided in Article 27 from other rights in 
the Covenant.  According to the Human Rights Committee: 
The protection of these [Article 27] rights is directed 
towards ensuring the survival and continued development 
of the cultural, religious and social identity of the minorities 
concerned . . . . Accordingly, . . . these rights must be 
protected as such and should not be confused with other 
personal rights conferred on one and all under the 
Covenant.309  
As a result, the Article 27 right of minorities “to profess and 
practise their own religion,”310 for example, should require distinct, 
and more vigorous, state protection than the Covenant’s ordinary 
freedom of religion provision (Article 18 of the ICCPR).311 
The Court’s underdeveloped view on nondiscrimination offers 
a roughly similar way of conceptualizing my proposed framework.  
Recall its statement on the equality principle’s transversal 
character:  the indigenous cultural identity impacts the 
Convention’s “scope and content,” and leads to special state 
                                                     
308 Here, I am not necessarily supporting the creation of new rights in 
addition to what are already enumerated in the American Convention.  However, 
my vida digna proposal has the additional benefit of making the right to cultural 
integrity, which is already recognized by the Court, more tangible and 
translatable to the Convention. 
309 The Rights of Minorities, supra note 37, ¶ 9. 
310 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
311 See NOWAK, supra note 38, at 658. 
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obligations and measures of protection.312  The concept certainly 
has power in the Inter-American jurisprudence:  the Court has 
declared that “the fundamental principle of equality and non-
discrimination has entered the realm of jus cogens.”313  That is, it 
regards the principle as “a peremptory norm of general 
international law . . . from which no derogation is permitted.”314 
Nevertheless, I believe that vida digna and the right to life 
provide a more apt conceptual vehicle, as we are truly addressing 
indigenous peoples’ lives, their “survival and continued 
development.”315  Moreover, the Court has already used vida digna 
as a configurative principle, a repository of several rights.  
Nondiscrimination, following Anaya, should instead be placed 
within the framework.316 
4.3.4. Vida Digna and Remedies 
Another advantage of transferring indigenous rights from 
Article 21 to vida digna is to safeguard extensive remedies.  Rights 
directly relate to remedies, and different rights violations will 
require distinct remedial responses.317  If indigenous norms are 
located in a multidimensional right to life, multifaceted reparations 
are facilitated.  In contrast, tethering varied indigenous rights to 
Article 21 could limit communities to typical property remedies 
and nothing more.  When restitution is not possible, the common 
remedy for a property violation is monetary compensation.318  Yet, 
                                                     
312 Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶51 (June 17, 2005).   
313 Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory 
Opinion OC-18/03, 2003 Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶ 101 (Sept. 17, 2003).  
See also Sarah Paoletti, Human Rights for All Workers: The Emergence of Protections for 
Unauthorized Workers in the Inter-American Human Rights System, HUM. RTS. BRIEF, 
at 5, 6 (Fall 2004) (explaining the importance of this advisory opinion). 
314 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art 53, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331.  
315 The Rights of Minorities, supra note 37, ¶ 9. 
316 It should be noted that several consider that the typical requirements for 
equality and non-discrimination of a classic international human rights approach 
are too limited for indigenous peoples and their “special set of demands and 
grievances.”  Falk, supra note 47, at 31. 
317 See John C. Jeffries, Jr., Disaggregating Constitutional Torts, 110 YALE L.J. 
259, 281 (2000); Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99 
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 857 (1999) (emphasizing that rights and remedies are 
“interdependent and inextricably intertwined”). 
318 E.g., RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 79E.01-.02 (Michael 
Allan Wolf ed., 2009). 
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as emphasized by many indigenous statements and actions, 
compensation alone could not remotely restore the status quo ante 
when ancestral lands have been taken or permanently damaged.319 
Until now, the Court’s remedial approach has generally 
sidestepped the limits of Article 21 and ordered sweeping 
reparations for indigenous communities.  To illustrate, it has 
required restitution and cleanup of ancestral lands, community 
development funds, apologies, legislative and institutional 
reforms, and material damages.320  It is true that some of these 
remedies correspond to rights violations other than communal 
property.  In fact, broad Court orders for “educational, housing, 
agricultural and health projects” correlate with social, economic, 
and cultural norms, as well as the defined civil and political rights 
of the American Convention.321 
Thus, the Court’s current remedial framework supports a range 
of rights for indigenous peoples, attending to several aspects of a 
‘dignified life.’  On the remedial side, then, the Court already 
promotes a robust concept of vida digna for indigenous 
communities.  Though there are certainly shortcomings to its 
approach, primarily involving insufficient monetary 
                                                     
319 See, e.g., STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF INDIANS AND TRIBES 50 (2012) 
(explaining that while the Sioux were offered $100 million by the U.S. government 
in compensation for the loss of their Black Hills territory, most have refused to 
accept the compensation because they only want their land back); Ana F. 
Vrdoljak, Reparations for Cultural Loss, in REPARATIONS FOR INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, 
supra note 93, at 197, 219-20 (“[T]he intrinsic importance of traditional lands to . . . 
indigenous communities makes monetary redress, in lieu of restitution, 
problematic and untenable.”). 
320 See Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and 
Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶¶ 285-323 (June 27, 
2012) (ordering a wide array of remedies); Thomas M. Antkowiak, An Emerging 
Mandate for International Courts: Victim-Centered Remedies and Restorative Justice, 47 
STAN. J. INT’L L. 279, 300-301 (2011) (considering compliance with Court remedies 
for indigenous communities); Thomas M. Antkowiak, Remedial Approaches to 
Human Rights Violations: The Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Beyond, 46 
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 351, 384-386 (2008) (outlining principal forms of remedies 
for such communities). 
321 These programs were ordered in Saramaka, among other judgments.  
Saramaka People v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 172, ¶ 201 (Nov. 28, 2007), interpreted by 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 185 (2008).  See Iris T. Figueroa, Remedies without 
Rights?: Reparations and ESC Rights in the Inter-American System,(May 2010) 
(unpublished student note), available at http://works.bepress.com/iris_figueroa 
/1 (arguing that the Court “refuses to acknowledge violations of [social, economic 
and cultural] rights while at the same time awarding a broad array of reparations 
to plaintiffs”). 
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compensation,322 the Tribunal’s reparations foster several norms 
that undergird Anaya’s self-determination principle. 
Formally placing the various indigenous rights within Article 4 
would further legitimate the Court’s reparative approach.  For 
example, states may question socioeconomic remedies in 
judgments where the Court does not declare a violation of Article 
26, the Convention’s provision on the subject.  But if the Court 
regularly clarifies that such remedies follow from a violation to the 
multidimensional vida digna principle, it would more precisely 
match remedies with rights.  Creating substantive-remedial 
symmetry would shield the Tribunal from criticism that it is 
overreaching in its reparations orders.  It would also likely reduce 
the danger that this multifaceted remedial approach would 
disappear under more conservative judges. 
4.4.  Potential Objections to a Vida Digna Approach 
It may appear that vida digna could not be equated to Anaya’s 
self-determination principle.  The community of Yakye Axa, for 
instance, was in a state of utter deprivation.  In demanding vida 
digna, one might argue that the Court merely was requiring the 
most basic of services—not considerable empowerment on many 
fronts.  That is, rather than the ceiling, the doctrine represents the 
floor, and thus could not possibly demand a wide spectrum of 
indigenous rights.  In some contexts, this is an accurate portrayal of 
vida digna.  The Court has pointed to a state’s obligation of 
“generating minimum living conditions that are compatible with 
the dignity of the human person.”323 
However, when considering “the existing international corpus 
juris regarding the special protection required” for indigenous 
peoples, the Yakye Axa judgment discussed a wide range of legal 
norms.324  These included “the duty of progressive development” 
of Article 26; the rights to health, “a healthy environment,” food, 
education, and “the benefits of culture” from the Additional 
Protocol to the American Convention; and “the pertinent 
provisions” from ILO Convention No. 169, without specifying 
further.325  In the judgment concerning the Sawhoyamaxa 
                                                     
322 This is a focus of my current research on the Inter-American Court.   
323 Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 162 (June 17, 2005). 
324 Id. ¶ 163. 
325 Id. 
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community, Judge García-Ramírez wrote in a separate opinion that 
the right to life 
is more than just a right to subsist, but is rather a right to 
self-development, which requires appropriate conditions. 
In such a framework, a single right with a double 
dimension is set, like the two-faced god Janus: one side, 
with a first-generation legal concept of the right to life; the 
other side, with the concept of a requirement to provide 
conditions for a feasible and full existence.326 
The Court may have already outlined, then, far more than minimal 
life conditions for vida digna.  Essential requisites for indigenous 
“self-development” and a “full existence” are emerging under 
Article 4. 
A further objection to the vida digna approach concerns norm 
dilution.  If Article 4 becomes a main stronghold of indigenous 
rights, Court judgments will find more violations of the 
provision—possibly diluting the meaning of the right to life.327  Yet 
some commentators have embraced the use of vida digna to hold 
states accountable for breaches of social, economic, and cultural 
rights.328  For now at least, Article 4 violations confer additional 
gravitas upon Court judgments.  This demands the attention of 
offending states and the media, thus bolstering victims’ efforts to 
obtain redress.329 
I am sympathetic to worries about norm dilution.  But I am 
more concerned about the weak conceptual basis for indigenous 
rights in the Inter-American system, and, clearly, the pervasive 
                                                     
326 Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 18 (Mar. 29, 2006) 
(concurring opinion of Judge García-Ramírez). 
327 Tara J. Melish, The Inter-American Court of Human Rights: Beyond 
Progressivity, in SOCIAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE: EMERGING TRENDS IN COMPARATIVE 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 372, 407 (Malcolm Langford ed., 2008) (discussing a 
“threat of serious norm dilution” in reference to Article 4 of the Convention).  
328 James L. Cavallaro & Emily Schaffer, Rejoinder: Justice Before Justiciability: 
Inter-American Litigation and Social Change, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 345, 382 
(2006) (“The key, as we explain in our initial piece, is to find ways to use this 
right-to-life focus to advance other aspects of social justice campaigns--including 
ESC rights.”); James L. Cavallaro & Emily J. Schaffer, Less as More: Rethinking 
Supranational Litigation of Economic and Social Rights in the Americas, 56 HASTINGS 
L.J. 217, 272 (2004). 
329 See Cavallaro & Schaffer, Rejoinder: Justice Before Justiciability, supra note 
328, at 381–82; Cavallaro & Schaffer, Less as More, supra note 328, at 272–81. 
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violations suffered by communities in the region.  Currently, vida 
digna provides the most viable alternative to self-determination.  
And, in fact, if both principles were available, a right-to-life 
framework would possibly be more respected by states than the 
abstract, and often contentious, right to self-determination.330 
Finally, a more basic question asks:  What difference would a 
transfer of ancestral land rights and other indigenous norms to 
Article 4 actually make?  Perhaps the shift is simply a matter of 
semantics, especially if the Court already grants significant 
remedies to indigenous communities.  Yet the ramifications could 
actually be quite concrete. 
By affirming to states that a collective right to life is truly at 
stake in these cases, presumptions would be reversed.  Petitioners 
would escape the domain of property rights, where restrictions are 
routine and states are granted wide latitude.  The state would be 
held to a rigorous standard, and when violations occur, reparations 
would be maintained at a high level.  The Court’s approach in 
these cases may evolve over time, as is common.  Yet it always 
must be consonant with upholding the Convention’s Article 4—not 
property rights, not cultural rights, but the right to life. 
To return to traditional land rights, a vida digna standard could 
require effective participation, impact assessments and mutually-
acceptable—not merely ‘reasonable’—benefits for all projects to 
proceed on indigenous territories.  Effective participation, 
furthermore, must require the free, prior, and informed consent of 
the communities concerned.  The consent requirement is only 
logical, as a state could not merely ‘consult’ a community about an 
initiative that impacts its right to life.  When a community does 
consent to a project, the state must monitor progress and bring 
operations to a halt if the company exceeds the community’s 
acceptable level of impact. 
Anaya’s other core norms—nondiscrimination, cultural 
integrity, social welfare and development, and self-government—
would also require enhanced protections for indigenous peoples.  
As noted, the Court already has expressed special concern for 
                                                     
330 It should be noted that the Human Rights Committee—and the several 
other human rights bodies that interpret instruments that contain the right to 
life—could also adopt a similar framework.  The Committee has already 
advanced broad interpretations of this right.  See, e.g., General Comment No. 6, 
supra note 293, ¶ 5 (“[T]he right to life has been too often narrowly interpreted . . . 
[it] cannot properly be understood in a restrictive manner, and the protection of 
this right requires that States adopt positive measures.”). 
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indigenous populations.  But it makes such general statements in 
reference to a number of vulnerable groups.331  The vida digna 
approach outlined here would seek to ensure that a core group of 
indigenous rights is consistently protected.332  Suggesting detailed 
requirements for all of Anaya’s five core principles falls out of this 
article’s scope, and necessitates further development.333  Still, 
demanding FPIC before commercial projects (based on the results 
of appropriate impact assessments), as well as mutually-acceptable 
benefits, would likely strengthen many of these key indigenous 
rights.334 
                                                     
331 See, e.g., Yakye Axa Indigenous Cmty. v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 162 (June 17, 2005) 
(holding that the state “has the duty to take positive, concrete measures geared 
toward fulfillment of the right to a decent life, especially in the case of persons 
who are vulnerable and at risk, whose care becomes a high priority”); Ximenes-
Lopes v. Brazil, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 149, ¶ 103 (July 4, 2006) (“[A]ny person who is in a vulnerable condition is 
entitled to special protection, which must be provided by the States if they are to 
comply with their general duties to respect and guarantee human rights.”). 
332 In a specific case, if those precise norms are not as important to the 
petitioners, the Court could make appropriate adjustments. 
333 As for “social welfare and development,” Anaya himself acknowledges 
that the boundaries of this category remain nebulous.  See ANAYA, supra note 26, at 
150.  It is a particularly difficult matter considering that millions of indigenous 
peoples languish below the poverty line in the Americas.  Would they all be 
entitled to an Article 4 claim before the Inter-American System?  Of course, if they 
wished to litigate the claim, as an initial matter it would be necessary to comply 
with admissibility requirements.  Once the petition is deemed admissible, Jo 
Pasqualucci has discussed a three-part test to assess potential violations:  
[One, proof that petitioners] lack the basic necessities of life and that they 
belong to a vulnerable group . . .   [Two,] evidence that the State had 
actual knowledge or reason to know of the alleged victims’ living 
situation; [and Three, proof  that] “their situation is the result of State 
action, negligence or omission. 
Pasqualucci, Right to a Dignified Life, supra note 288, at 28-29.  While such petitions 
could overwhelm the Inter-American System, the Inter-American Commission 
would likely process them in a strategic fashion.  Such litigation could eventually 
induce states to improve indigenous policies and programs to avoid repeated—
and costly—appearances before the Inter-American Court. 
334 Engle is skeptical even of consent requirements, because they “assume 
that indigenous peoples are in a position to make meaningful choices.”  ENGLE, 
supra note 17, at 205.  Informed by indigenous peoples and others, the Inter-
American Court will need to clarify further how states may obtain legitimate 
consent.  Through coercion, fraud and illicit payments, corporate and government 
representatives have usurped traditional decision-making processes and divided 
communities in attempts to secure approval for projects.  See, e.g, Kichwa 
Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 245, ¶¶ 186, 194, 203 (June 27, 2012). 
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5. CONCLUSION 
Pervasive intrusions upon ancestral lands and assaults to 
indigenous peoples’ ways of life have led to crisis in the 
hemisphere.  Nevertheless, the Inter-American Commission and 
Court have softened their positions.  The Inter-American 
Commission, for example, recently withdrew its calls to suspend 
operations at the Guatemalan gold mine and the Brazilian dam.335  
And, as discussed above, the Court eluded consent requirements 
and other protections in the Sarayaku judgment.336 
The Inter-American human rights system cannot relent to the 
current political and corporate pressures.  The Court has overcome 
significant challenges before, and can do so again.337  To galvanize 
indigenous rights in the region, the Tribunal should adopt the 
proposed vida digna framework.  A new structural basis for 
indigenous rights is necessary.  The Court’s current property 
approach, even with Saramaka’s ‘safeguards,’ ultimately provides 
only a rhetorical defense for indigenous peoples. 
 
 
                                                     
335 See Indigenous Communities of the Xingu River Basin, Pará, Brazil, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H.R., Precautionary Measures No. 382/10 (2011), available at 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp; Communities of the 
Maya People (Sipakepense and Mam) of the Sipacapa and San Miguel Ixtahuacán 
Municipalities in the Department of San Marcos, Guatemala, Inter-Am. Comm’n 
H.R., Precautionary Measures No. 260/07 (2010), available at http://www.oas. 
org/en/iachr/decisions/precautionary.asp. 
336 It should also be noted that, in 2010, the Court rejected a request for 
provisional measures to protect the Ngöbe indigenous communities of Panama.  
The communities had protested that a dam would flood their ancestral lands.   
Four Ngöbe Indigenous Communities v. Panama, Request for Provisional 
Measures, Order of the Court, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (May 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/ngobe_se_01_ing.pdf. 
337 For example, Peru under Alberto Fujimori “attempted to withdraw from 
the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court without denouncing the American 
Convention.”  PASQUALUCCI, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 99, at 145.  The 
Tribunal rejected this attempt, and continued to consider Peruvian cases before it.  
In 2001, after a change in government, Peru announced that it considered itself 
fully subject to the Court’s jurisdiction.  See, e.g., id. at 145–46. 
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